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PROTECTION OF TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP RIGHTS
PROTECTING the interests of trade union members against exploitation by their
leadership is an increasingly serious issue both of law and of social policy. As a
legal problem the settlement of factional disputes within trade unions is distinct for
most purposes from the law applied to conflicts between capital and labor, and to
conflicts between rival unions, the two other major areas of labor controversy.
Three factors make disagreement within the unions a constantly more frequent and
more bitter source of litigation: first, the spread of labor racketeering; secondly,
the atrophy of the intrenched, older leaders; thirdly, the militancy of rank-and-file
membership. Cases involving members' rights formerly arose in controversies be-
tween a union and members who aided employers, 1 worked in non-union shops,2 or
accepted less than a union wage.3 In such situations public sympathy was generally
for the unions. But the equities have shifted, and cases are multiplying in which
innocent and energetic members have been punished by a corrupt or inactive leader-
ship. This change in the factual setting of the problem of members' rights has
sharpened the contradiction between the competing social purposes which condition
the legal treatment of such rights. On the one hand, a policy of preserving maximal
freedom for the unions leads courts to encourage the settlement of domestic con-
flicts within the domestic tribunals. Thus, most courts seem to require in these
cases, as in cases involving rights of stockholders and of exchange and trade asso-
ciation members, an exhaustion of internal remedies as part of the complaining union
member's cause of action. But since it manifestly remains necessary to assure
legal protection of members' interests where they cannot expect a satisfac-
tory private settlement of their grievances, the courts have, despite their purpose of
preserving maximal freedom for the unions, developed exceptions and amendments
to the rule of exhaustion of internal remedies.4
These exceptions and amendments, constituting in effect a code of union membership
rights, have been defined in a series of suits brought by members against unions
or their officers for wrongful expulsion or other disciplinary damage. The courts
have restricted their interference in the internal affairs of trade unions to declaring
the simple rules of domestic combat.5 The group in power has not been permitted to
1. Burke v. Monumental Division, No. 52, 273 F. 707 (D Md. 1919).
2. International S. & E. Union No. 31 v. Meyer (1924) 6 LAw AND LABOR 224 (Super.
Court Ohio 1923); Philadelphia Union No. 72 v. Bethlehem Plate Co. (Court of Common
Pleas, Phila. County, Penn. 1924); Stem, A New Legal Problem in the Relations of Capital
and Laboe, (1926) 74 U. or PENN. L. RaV. 523. Contra: New England Wood Heel Co. v
Nolan, 268 Mass. 191, 167 N. E. 323 (1929); Notes (1929) 9 B. U, L. REV. 280; (1930)
25 ILL. L. Rxv. 93; but see Wabash R. Co. v. Hannahan, 121 Fed. 563 (C. C. E. D Mo,
1903) semble; Willcutt v. Driscoll, 200 Mass. 110, 85 N. E. 897 (1908). Oliphant and
Carey, Present Status of the Hitchman Case (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 441, 454.
3. Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582 (1917) and note 2, passim.
4. The present status of the rule is clearly tabulated in Emma v. Loggia Fasel Itallcl,
No. 16, 7 N. J. Misc. R. 387 (Sup. Ct. 1929); Walsche v. Sherlock, 110 N. 1. Eq. 223,
159 Atl. 661 (1932); see also Gersh v. Ross, 238 App. Div. 552, 265 N. Y. S. 459 (Ist Dept.
1933); Note (1934) 7 So. CAL. L. Ray. 339.
5. "The field of judicial interference with the actions of voluntary, nonpublic bodies,
as to controversies between their members and as to the method and manner in which the
rights of membership may be maintained and continued, is, and should be, a very narrow
one-so that only upon the dearest kind of showing, either that the constitution and rules
are violated by the decisions of the tribunals set up by them, or that the remedies provided
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punish its opponents by expulsion, or deprivation of seniority rights,0 or by exorbitant
fines,7 when such action was taken in bad faith;8 or without strict adherence to
the procedure established in the union constitution;0 or where the penalties, though
constitutionally executed, were authorized by rules themselves repugnant to "natural"
or constitutional law.' o  Members have been awarded damages and reinstatement
where the disciplinary acts or rules of the union contravened public policy by denying
notice and hearing to the accused before a union tribunal' or the "right" to an
appeal from the holding of such a tribunal,'12 or by interfering with rights considered
to be outside the zone of legitimate union interest, such as the right to vote,'3 to
petition the legislature,14 or to have recourse to the courts.10 The recorded law
for appeal from or the review of the decisions of their own tribunals are non-existent or
unreasonable, should the courts permit their jurisdiction to be invoked." Local No. 7 v.
Bowen 278 Fed. 271, 274-275 (S. D. Tex. 1922); and see Steele v. South Wales Miners
Federation (1907] 1 K. B. 316.
6. Railway Conductors v. Jones, 78 Colo. 80, 239 Pac. 882 (1925). See also Greg- v.
Starks, 188 Ky. 834, 224 S. W. 459 (1920) (Enforcement of decision of Railway Board of
Adjustment enjoined as interfering with plaintiff's seniority rights under collective labor
agreement between union and road); Long v. Baltimore & Ohio Rr. Co., 155 Md. 265,
141 Atl. 504 (1928); Ryan v. N. Y. Central Rr. Co., 267 Mich. 202, 255 N. W. 365 (1934);
Crisler v. Crum, 115 Neb. 375, 213 N. W. 366 (1927).
7. Froelich v. Musicians Mutual Benefit Ass'n., 93 Mo. App. 383, 67 S. W. 669 (1902);
Mullen v. Seegers, 220 Mo. App. 847, 294 S. W. 745 (1927); Blanchard v. Newark Council,
77 N. J. Law 389, 71 Atl. 1131 (1909); affirmed 78 N. J. Law 737, 76 AUt. 1037 (1910).
8. Local No. 7 v. Bowen, 278 Fed. 271 (S. D. Texas 1922); Malloy v. Carroll, 272
Mass. 524, 172 N. E. 790 (1930); Hall v. Morrin, 293 S. W. 435 (Mo. App. 1927);
Lo Bianco v. Cushing, 115 N. J. Eq. 558, 171 At. 778 (1934); ibid. 177 Ad. 102 (1935);
Rodier v. Huddell, 232 App. Div. 531, 250 N. Y. Supp. 336 (1st Dept. 1931); vrlliamon
v. Randolph, 48 Misc. 96, 96 N. Y. Supp. 644 (Sup. Ct. 1905) (collects authorities).
9. Burke v. Monumental Division, 273 Fed. 707 (Md. 1919); International Brotherhood
v. Green, 210 Ala. 496, 98 So. 569 (1923); Abdon v. Wallace, 165 N. E. 63 (Ind. App.
1929); Spiegel v. Locomotive Eng. Ass'n, 166 Minn. 366, 207 N. W. 722 (1926); Mintz,
Trade Union Abuses (1932) 6 ST. JomN's L. REv. 272; Steever, Control oj Labor Througz
Uniosi Discipline (1931) 16 CoRu. L. Q. 212. Notes (1924) 24 CoL. L. REv. 551; (1921)
20 M-gicu. L. REv. 245; (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 784.
10. Bricklayers' Union v. Bowen, 183 N. Y. Supp. 855, 859 (Sup. Ct. 1920) ("The
demands of fair play, which in the final analysis is the spirit of the law of the land");
Williamson v. Randolph, 48 Misc. 96, 96 N. Y. Supp. 644 (Sup. Ct. 1905) ("fair play");
Maclean v. Workers' Union [1929] 1 Ch. 602, 625 ("The principles of fair play so deeply
rooted in the minds of modem Englishmen").
11. Swaine v. Miller, 72 Mo. App. 446 (1897); Gilmore v. Palmer, 109 Misc. 552, 179
N. Y. Supp. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1919); Blek v. Kirkman, 148 Misc. 522, 266 N. Y. Supp. 91 (Sup.
Ct. 1933). Contra: Fish v. National Union, noted in (1928) 72 Sol. J. 179; and see People
v. Love, 199 App. Div. 815, 192 N. Y. Supp. 354 (Ist Dep't 1922); Eckereley v. Merszy
Docks and Harbour Board [1894] 2 Q. B. 667, 673; Maclean v. Workers' Union [1929]
1 Ch. 602, 624.
12. Local No. 7 v. Bowen, 278 Fed. 271, 275 (S. D. Texas 1922); Wahche v. Sherlock,
110 N. 1. Eq. 223, 234, 159 AUt. 661, 666 (1932). The appeal provided must not he illusory
or impractical: Barbrick v. Huddell, 245 Mass. 428, 139 Xq. E. 629 (1923) (appeal wain);
Lindahl v. Supreme Court, I. 0. F., 100 Minn. 87, 110 N. W. 358 (1907) (delay of three
years on appeal denial of substantial justice).
13. Schneider v. Local Union No. 60, 116 La. 270, 40 Co. 700 (1905).
14. Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67, 113 A. 70 (1921); Notes (1922)
35 HARv. L. Rnv. 332, 348; (1922) 6 M=enr. L. RLv. 241.
15. Moyer v. Butte Miners Union, 232 Fed. 788 (D. Mont. 1916); ibid. 246 F. 657
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of membership within a trade union has been a negative development of prohibitions
against extreme forms of punitive or coercive action, not a formulation of concrete
standards for the procedure of the union in its daily life.
A recent New Jersey case,1 6 however, attempts to formulate such concrete standards
by extending the concept of public policy to define the political rights of trade union
members inter sese. Action was brought in chancery by representative members
of a trade union'7 Junior Local, to annul discriminatory features of the trade union
constitution embodied in their membership contracts.' 8 The members of the Junior
Local'0 had union status, but no power to vote, or to meet without senior members
being present as officers, or to participate in collective bargaining activities with
employers or with the code authority. Furthermore, severe fee discriminations were
imposed upon Juniors;20 and, since Seniors reserved the privilege of replacing Juniors
at any time, the summer drop in employment was met by laying off Juniors and
giving their jobs to Seniors. The union was vested by closed shop agreements with
control of 80% of all operators' jobs in Hudson County. The New Jersey Court of
Errors and Appeals held for complainants, despite a failure on their part to exhaust
internal remedies, on the ground that the contracts were against public policy: first
as an "embezzlement" 2' of members' constitutional rights, and secondly as an un-
warrantable restraint of trade.
(C. C. A. 9th, 1917), cert. denied, 245 U. S. 671 (1917); Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men v. Barnhill, 214 Ala. 565, 108 So. 456 (1926) (by-law giving officers final rights over
members' property); Austin v. Searing, 16 N. Y. 112 (1857).
16. Cameron v. International Alliance, Local No. 384, 176 At. 692 (N. J. 1935).
17. Affiliated with the notorious International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees
and Motion Picture Machine Operators of the United States and Canada. For data on
working methods within this organization, see International Alliance v. Rex Theatre, 73 F.
(2d) 92 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934); Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N. Y. 277, 177 N. E. 833 (1931);
Kaplan v. Elliott, 145 Misc. 863, 261 N. Y. Supp. 112 (Sup. Ct. 1932); Shapiro v, Gehlman,
152 Misc. 13, 272 N. Y. Supp. 624 (Sup. Ct. 1934) aff'd, N. Y. L. J. April 13, 1935,
at 1 (App. Div. 1st Dep't); Comment (1933) 42 YAaE L. J. 1244; Notes (1933) 17 MiNN.
L. Rav. 228; (1933) 7 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 316; (1932) 32 COL. L. Rv. 1248.
18. Although the formal requirements of a contract are not fulfilled by such member-
ship arrangements, and the measure of damages used is often not contractual but tortlous,
the courts universally call trade union membership a contract relation limited by the
constitution, by-laws, membership card, and other manifestations of intent used by the
parties: Lawson v. Hewel, 118 Cal. 613, 50 Pac. 763 (1897); Ryan v. N. Y. Central 267
Mich. 202, 255 N. W. 365 (1934); Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N. Y. 277, 281, 177 N. E. 833,
834 (1931); Maclean v. Workers' Union [1929] 1 Ch. 607; Note (1929) 45 L. Q. Rrv.
279. But see Chafee, The Interna Affairs of Associations not for Profit (1930) 43 IHLMV.
L. Ra,. 993, 1003; Comment (1934) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 291.
In New Jersey membership in a trade union is a "property right": Brennan v. United
Hatters, 73 N. J. Law 729, 742, 65 Atl. 165, 170 (1905) ; Cameron v. International Alliance,
176 AtI. 692, 698 (N. J. 1935); Lo Bianco v. Cushing, 177 Atl. 102, 103 (1935); see
O'Brien v. Musical Mutual Union, 64 N. J. Eq. 525, 54 At. 150 (Ch. 1903); Erdman v.
Mitchell, 27 Pa. 79, 91, 56 Ati. 327, 331 (1903).
19. The Junior Local was the consequence of a technical accident. When sound films
were introduced in 1928, staffs operating motion picture projectors were doubled. Instead
of doubling its membership, the union allowed the necessary new men to be taken on and
trained under permit from the union. The forty-one permit holders were organized as a
Junior Local to protect them against ouster on demand of itinerant union members.
20. Juniors paid $454 a year in fees, Senior members only $80. Initiation into senior
local, moreover, cost $3000. Both groups of members received the same wages and were
presumptively equal in skill.
21. Cameron v. International Alliance 176 Atl. 692, 701 (N. J. 1935).
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The first of the two grounds for the decision of the principal case asserts in effect
that the internal arrangements of a trade union are illegal if they deny a member
his quasi-constitutional right to participate democratically in the common legislative
functions of the trade union. The rationale of the argument is based on the most
familiar premise of labor law, namely, that workers may associate themselves con-
tractually into trade unions for the single purpose of ameliorating their economic
position.22  Trade union compulsion and rules within the sanction of this pur-
pose are permissible restrictions on individual freedom to contract. If, therefore,
a contribution to the general economic improvement of labor is the only possible
justification for trade union rules and acts interfering with the workers' freedom to
contract, the contract at issue in the principal case, which denies Junior members
any share in fixing the terms of their economic destiny, is void as against public
policy because it severely limits the workers' freedom to contract without adding
to the "economic independence and security of labor."23 In basing its holding on
this ground, the court in effect asserts a rule of law that the union's control over
its members' right to work must be exercised in a cooperative and democratic vway,
a principle not without precedent in the literature of labor law.m 2 - If the earlier
cases of expulsion read a kind of due process clause into all trade union constitutions,
the principal case extends the democratic ideal by asserting that trade union member-
ship guarantees the member a right to equal protection of the union rules.
But the language of the principal decision is not restricted to reading a principle
of equal protection into the law of trade union membership. The court indicates,
and the main stream of New Jersey decisions makes the inference tenable, 5 that
a second reason for the holding is based on the court's opposition to labor monopoly.
As it has been adapted to the facts of the principal case, this opposition appears
in the form of a rule that a closed shop agreement, or a monopolistic arrangement less
complete than a closed shop, is illegal; and that the fact that the union is operating
under a closed shop agreement empowers the member to be judicially relieved of his
obligations of membership at any time, even though the contract of membership
itself be entirely fair.20 For the membership contract is held to be inextricably
part of the larger closed-shop agreement, "and as foul as that of which it formed
22. Folsom v. McNeil 235 Mass. 269, 126 N. E. 479 (1920); Bayonne Textile Corp. v.
Amer. Fed. of Silk Workers, 172 At1. 551, (N. J. 1934), rev'g 114 N. J. Eq. 307, 163 Al. 799
(Ch. 1933); Exchange Bakery v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1927).
23. Bayonne Textile Corp. v. Amer. Fed. of Silk Workers, 172 Atl. 551, 556 (N. J.
1934) rev'g 114 N. J. Eq. 307, 168 At. 799 (Ch. 1933).
24. Chalghian v. International, 114 N. J. Eq. 497, 169 Atd. 327 (Ch. 1933) (receiver
appointed for mismanaged local); Local No. 11 of Ironworkers v. McKee, 114 N. J. Eq.
555, 169 At. 351 (Ch. 1933); Harris v. Geier, 112 N. J. Eq. 99, 103, 164 At. 50, 53 (Ch.
1932); Bricklayers Union v. Bowen, 183 N. Y. Supp. 855, aff'd, 189 N. Y. Supp. 938 (1920).
25. Lehigh Structural Steel Co. v. Atlantic S. & R. Co., 92 N. J. Eq. 131, 111 Atd. 376
(Ch. 1920); Baldwin v. International Brotherhood, 91 N. J. Eq. 240, 109 At]. 147 (Ch.
1920); O'Brien v. Musical Mutual Union, 64 N. J. Eq. 525, 54 Atd. 150 (Ch. 1903). But
see Harris v. Geier, 112 N. J. Eq. 99, 103, 164 Atl. 50, 53 (Ch. 1932); Bayer v. Brother-
hood of Painters, 108 N. J. Eq. 257, 154 Atl. 759 (1931).
26. O'Brien v. Musical Union, 64 N. J. Eq. 525, 54 Atl. 150 (Ch. 1903) (indirect enforce-
ment of labor monopoly refused). Walsche v. Sherlock, 110 N. J. Eq. 223, 159 AtU. 661 (1932)
(card index system for rotating jobs enjoined, inter alia, as part of a "monopoly in the
making7 in the building trades of one county); Upholsterer's Union v. Essex Reed & Fibre
Co., 174 Atl. 207 (N. J. Ch. 1934) (employment agreement between union and defendant
void because identical agreements bound sixty-five percent of the local industry); note
(1935) 9 TEmPLE L. QuAR. 236.
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a part."27  Thus, in the principal case members of a union are granted remedies
against their leaders, not only for the general inequity of their membership con-
tracts, but because elsewhere in the situation there was an element of monopoly
of which neither party to the suit has complained, and from which neither has
suffered damage. 28
The principal case thus has mutually incompatible consequences: on the one hand
the court extends the principle of fair dealing in internal trade union activity in a
manner calculated to safeguard the rights of members and thus in the long run to
improve trade union organization; but at the same time it sets up a criterion of
illegality for trade union membership contracts, based not on solicitude for members'
rights, which was the issue at hand, but on the irrelevant object of protecting
employers against labor monopoly. In asserting the latter objective, it affords to
disgruntled individual union members a device by which they may secure the aid
of the courts in overthrowing on the irrelevant ground of monopoly their otherwise
valid contractual obligations to fellow members. The latter doctrine of the prin-
cipal case is thus a potential threat to trade union unity, and therefore to the
effectiveness of collective bargaining. If unchecked by the legislature or by a change
of judicial attitude, the doctrine that a membership contract, though entirely fair,
can be overthrown at the instance of a dissatisfied union member because the union
is participating in an illegal closed shop agreement can be made generally accessible
as an anti-labor precedent in the various jurisdictions where labor monopoly remains
illegal.29 Since the economic consequences of any collective labor action are
monopolistic,2 0 the rule is potentially useful as a judicial device for outlawing labor
action which the courts wish to outlaw.
27. Walsche v. Sherlock, 110 N. J. Eq. 223, 256, 159 Atl. 661, 674 (1932).
28. On requirement of privity and damages for rights of action to complain of Illegality
of clause in union contract, see: Des Moines City Ry. Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n, 204 Iowa
1195, 213 N. W. 264 (1927); Scott Stafford Opera House v. Minn. Musicians' As3'n, 118
Minn. 410, 136 N. W. 1092 (1912); Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, 247 N. Y.
65, 159 N. E. 863 (1928); Zaat v. Building Trades Council, 172 Wash. 445, 20 P. (2d)
589 (1933). Contra: Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 74 N. E. 603, (1905); Lehigh
Structural Steel v. Atlantic Smelting Co., N. J. Eq. 131 (1920).
29. The legality of a closed shop comes before the courts either as an objective of strike
action, or as the substance of a collective labor agreement. Many jurisdictions, which
concede the legality of an individual closed shop, are unwilling to allow that full union
control of the local labor market is within the zone of public policy. Decorative Stone
Co. v. Building Trades Council, 18 F. (2d) 333 (S. D. N. Y. 1927); Connors v. Connely,
86 Conn. 641, 86 Atl. 600 (1913); Cohn & Roth Co. v. Bricklayers Union, 92 Conn. 161,
167, 101 Atl. 659, 661 (1917); Folsom v. Lewis, 208 Mass. 336, 94 N. E. 316 (1911);
Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N. Y. 207, 76 N. E. 5 (1906); McCord v. Thompson Starrett, 198
N. Y. 587, 92 N. E. 1090 (1910) aftg, 129 App. Div. 130, 113 N. Y. Supp. 385 (1st Dep't
1908); Bandler v. Lorberbaum, N. Y. L. J. Feb. 7, 1934, col. 2, at 650 (Sup. Ct.); Polk
v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 20 Ohio App. 317 321, 151 N. E. 808, 810 (1925); Harper v. Local
No. 520, 48 S. W. (2d) 1033, 1043 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); FRANXruxRza mD GnRnME,
TaE LABOR L NjucrioN (1930) 24-47; W , THE GOVERNMENT i LAoR DisPUTEs (1932)
23-27 (cases listed, 26-27).
30. HicKs, THEORY OF WAGFS (1933) 136-229, 179-197; Picou, TnEORY O UNEMI'LO-
IfENT (1933) 252-262, 293-295.
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CHALLENGING THE VALmITY OF A FEDERAL TAX BY MEANS OF THE DECLEARATORY
JUDGMENT
THE utility of the declaratory judgment, demonstrated by its success in England,'
Europe,2 and the thirty four American jurisdictions3 which have adopted it, led the
proponents of the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act4 to anticipate for it a useful
career as a vehicle of justice and a reformer of federal procedure.5 A manifestation
of its possibilities in this regard appears in a recent case
0 attacking the constitu-
tionality of the federal Act for the Stabilization of the Tobacco Mfarket, more
commonly referred to as the Kerr-Smith Act.
7 This Act, in an effort to protect
tobacco growers who had made acreage reduction contracts under the A. A. A.
8 from
unfair competition by non-contractors and marginal growers, levied upon the latter
a tobacco sales tax of from 25% to 33 1/3%.9 The plaintiffs, growers of tobacco
on rented land, having neither acceptable leases
1 0 nor the consent of their landlords,
were unable to sign the benefit contracts which would have exempted them from the
tax imposed by the Act. In consequence, the plaintiffs, asserting the unconstitu-
tionality of the Act, sued to enjoin the Collector of Internal Revenue and the United
States District Attorney" from carrying out its provisions, and in addition sought
a declaratory judgment as to its validity. The District Court refused to grant the
injunctive relief sought, but, under the discretionary power bestowed by the Federal
Declaratory Judgments Act,4 declared the Kerr-Smith Act unconstitutional
6
From the procedural standpoint this decision is significant, for it affords a new
method by which a citizen may determine the validity of a federal tax levied upon
him. The traditional policy has been to require the payment of a tax before there
could be any judicial determination as to its validity.'
2 The taxpayer, moreover, was
required to follow a devious procedure before a refund could be obtained.
3 The
1. Jennings, Declaratory Judgments against Public Authorities in England (1932) 41
YAix L. J. 407; Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment-A Needed Procedural Reform (1918)
28 YALE L. J. 1, 25, 105 et seq.
2. BoRcnARD, DzcLAPATORy Jumc;mm s (1934) 215 et seq.
3. Id. at 245.
4. 48 STAT. 955 (1934), 28 U. S. C. A. § 400 (Supp. 1935).
5. See Borchard, The Federal Declaratory Judgments Act (1934) 21 VA. L. RLV. 35, 50;
SEN. R P. No. 1005, 73rd CoNG., 2d Szss., submitted by Senator King, May 10, 1934.
6. Penn Bros. v. Glenn, decided April 13, 1935, by Judge Dawson in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Kentucky.
7. 48 STAT. 1275 (1934), 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 751-766 (Supp. 1934).
8. 48 STAT. 31 (1933), 7 U. S. C. A. c. 26 (Supp. 1933).
9. The exact rate of the tax is to be set by the Secretary of Agriculture. The tax v.as
not intended to prevent noncontractors from raising tobacco; it sought, rather, to make
certain that the noncontractors would not obtain a larger income than those growers who
participated in the reduction programs of the Agricultural Department.
10. As defined by the Director of the Production Division, Agricultural Adjustment
Administration.
11. The proceeding against the District Attorney was dsmssed by Judge Davwson on
the theory that he lacked a sufficient personal interest in the controversy to make him a
proper defendant. The usual procedure has been to allow the suit against the Attorney.
Cf. Black v. Little, 8 F. Supp. 867 (E. D. Mich. 1934).
12. 14 STAT. 475 (1867), 26 U. S. C. A. § 154 (1926); 43 STAT. 343 (1924), 26 U. S.
C. A. §§ 116-120 (1926); Note (1932) 45 HALV. L. REv. 1221. The reasons for this policy
are well expressed in State Ry. Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575, 613 (1875), and Kensett v. Stive-.,
10 Fed. 517, 526 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1880).
13. A claim must first be filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and after
six months have passed, or after an adverse decision by the Commissioner, a suit for refund
may be brought in the courts. See 26 U. S. C. A. § 196 (1926).
YALE LAW JOURNAL
hardship to the taxpayer is apparent, for deficiency assessments were frequently so
large as to cause bankruptcy or necessitate an unprofitable sale of a large portion
of the taxpayer's assets.14 No refund could compensate for these injuries or for
the refusal of the government to pay interest.15 In more recent years, Congress
by the creation of the Board of Tax Appeals,'( the courts through judicial legisla-
tion,17 and the taxpayers themselves by indirect methods' 8 have sought to modify
the effect of section 3224 of the Revised Statutes,19 providing that "no suit for the
purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained
in any court," and thus to avoid the hardships of the existing procedure for chal-
lenging the validity of federal taxes. The present use of the declaratory judgment
marks the culmination of these efforts, for while the declaration of the invalidity
of a taxing statute before the collection of the tax from the taxpayer does no literal
violence to section 3224,20 its practical effect may be to circumvent the section.
The declaratory judgment now enables a taxpayer, when confronted by a tax of
dubious validity, to secure immediately and in one relatively speedy action, a perma-
nent declaration of his rights; and it is to be anticipated that the government will
respect this conclusive adjudication and not demand payment of the tax thus held
invalid. Nor is this use of the declaratory judgment open to the traditional objec-
tions raised against the use of the injunction in tax collection. The argument that
no government can afford to be hampered in the vital task of collecting its revenue
21
has no validity against a suit for declaratory relief, for the declaration may possibly
be obtained before the time for payment of the tax has elapsed, and even where
the declaration is not forthcoming by that time, the court may not temporarily
14. Gorovitz, Federal Tax Injunctions (1932) 10 TAx MACAziNE 446, 450; Note (1932)
45 HAv. L. Rv. 1221. Deficiency assessments of income and estate taxes are now excepted,
See note 16, infra.
15. See Notes (1928) 57 A. L. R. 357 (1932) 76 A. L. R. 1012.
16. A taxpayer may contest a deficiency assessment (income and estate taxes only)
before the Board, and, pending this appeal, the collection of the tax is prohibited, and I1
enjoinable notwithstanding section 3224. See 26 U. S. C. A. § 1048 (1926) ; Gorovitz, supra
note 14, at 470.
17. Section 3224 was at first viewed as an absolute limitation upon the jurisdiction of
the federal courts [State Ry. Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575 (1875)] and the remedy provided
by statute for the taxpayer after payment was held to be exclusive. See Snyder v. Marks,
109 U. S. 189, 193 (1883). A dictum in Dodge v. Brady, 240 U. S. 122 (1915) weakened
this position by making an exception where extraordinary circumstances existed. This
exception was reannounced in Bailey v. George, 259 U. S. 16 (1922), and in Hill v. Wallace,
259 U. S. 44 (1922) the dictum became decision. "Penalty" taxes were likewise made an
exception. Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U. S. 557 (1922); Regal Drug Co. v. Wardell, 260 U. S.
386 (1922); Violette v. Rasmussen, 264 U. S. 568 (1924); Miller, Restraining he Collection
oj F'ederal Taxes (1923) 71 U. oF PA. L. Ray. 318; Gorovitz, snpra note 15, at 446 et seq.;
See Note (1923) 37 HAgv. L. R-v. 255.
18. The payment of the tax was restrained, rather than the collection. Pollock v.
Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429 (1895); Brushaber v. Union Pacific Ry. 240
U. S. 1 (1915) ; see Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, 63 (1922).
19. 26 U. S. C. A. § 154 (1926).
20. The declaratory action can be reconciled with section 3224 on the ground that It
merely declares rights and does not restrain collection. This is particularly true where, as
here, the amount of the disputed tax ik deposited in court in accordance with the stipulation
of the parties.
21. That the governmental fears of financial embarrassment were always more apparent
than real, has not lessened the persistency with which the argument is advanced. See Gore-
vitz, loc. cit. supra note 14.
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restrain the collection during the pendency of the trial as it may in injunction pro-
ceedings. It is likely, however, that the collector will in the latter case deem it
best to withhold collection until a declaration of rights has been made. Further-
more, if the taxpayer's claim is a valid one, both he and the government should be
interested in as early an adjudication as possible. Hence it would seem to be short-
sighted on the part of the government to attack the use of the declaratory judgment
in the instant case.22 The declaratory judgment is admirably suited to the deter-
mination of broad constitutional questions,m since it gives to both the citizen and
the administration an early declaration of rights before expensive commitments are
made. Furthermore the declaratory judgment resolves the dilemma, presented to
every collector by questionable taxing statutes, of whether to refuse to enforce the
act and thereby subject himself to official sanctions, including removal, or to levy
the tax and thus become personally liable to the taxpayer. 24 If it is urged that
the use of the declaratory judgment in tax questions will subject the federal courts
to a flood of litigation on intricate revenue matters which they are not qualified
to handle and which are now handled by the Board of Tax Appeals, it may be said
in reply that the use of the declaratory judgment is discretionary and that the
courts will not employ it where a more serviceable administrative remedy such as
the Board of Tax Appeals has been provided.2 From the social and economic
standpoint, therefore, there seem to be no valid objections to this use of the declar-
atory judgment.
But if the Supreme Court wishes to evade a decision on the merits of the Kerr-
Smith Act, or if it does not wish to commit itself in view of the expiration of the
Act in the near future,26 or if it still has a lingering distrust of the declaratory
judgment, 27 there are several technical legal objections to its use in the instant case
which the Court might employ as the basis for an adverse decision. Wile the
constitutionality of the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act 4 is not open to attackd  3
it might be objected that the declaration of rights by the District Court was an
abuse of discretion because contrary to the intent of Congress as revealed both by
22. See the brief for the defendant collector in the principal case, as well as in Meotsinger
v. Robertson, United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina.
23. The principal case marks the first time that the declaratory judgment has b-een used
to hold a federal statute unconstitutional. Objections to its use in this manner were ral-ed
in a Note (1932) 45 HARv. L. Ruv. 10S9, but effectively answered in a Comment (1932) 41
YA=x L. J. 1195. See also BoRcnxuD, supra note 2, at 301, 549 et seq.
24. BORc uAm, supra note 2, at 349, 553; Field, The Effect of an Uncorstifuioral
Statute in the Law of Public Officers (1928) 77 U. or P,%. L. Ray. 155; Crocker, The Tort
Liability of Public Officers Who Act Under Unconstitutional Statutes (1929) 2 So. CAir. L.
Rxv. 236.
25. See BoRcHAIW, D=C.RAToR JuDGmrNTs (1934) 109, 156. While the remedy in the
Kerr-Smith Act [section 11(b), 7 U. S. C. A. § 701 (Supp. 1934)] is statutory, it is not
more serviceable since it applies only to securing tax refunds, and necesstates the filing of
a daim with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and a delay of six months before appeal
may be taken to the courts, unless there is an earlier adverse ruling by the Commis-oner.
26. The tax provided for by the Act is not to apply to any tobacco harvested after
April 30, 1936. 7 U. S. C. A. § 753(b) (Supp. 1934).
27. Disapproval of the declaratory action has been expressed by the Court on several
occasions. Cf. Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70 (1927); Willing v. Chicago
Auditorium Assoc., 277 U. S. 274 (1928), probably overruled in Nashville, C., & St. L. Ry.
v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249 (1933).
2S. The constitutionality of this procedure was settled by the Court in Nashville, C.,
& St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249 (1933). See Ellingwood, The Constitutionality of
Declaratory Judgments (1933) 28 Iro. L. REV. 74.
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the policy expressed in section 3224 and by the special statutory remedy provided
in the Kerr-Smith Act for tax refunds. 2 5 Although this use of the declaratory judg-
ment is in form compatible with these statutes, the fact that it may in effect circum-
vent them, might lead the Court to the conclusion that this action was not contem-
plated by Congress in enacting the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act. On the other
hand the court may as easily conclude that since the act was passed subsequently to
section 3224, and makes no exception as to tax cases, the use of the declaratory judg-
ment in such cases was intended. Secondly, it may be objected that a declaratory
judgment should not be granted where another adequate remedy is available, Although
this argument is in flat contradiction to section one of the Declaratory Judgments Act,20
it has been adopted by some courts.30 Thirdly, it could be argued that this suit
cannot be maintained since, in reality, it is a suit against the United States without
its consent. Closely linked to this argument is the objection that the defendant
collector has no adverse interest sufficient to make this a proper case or controversy
for the exercise of the declaratory judgment. Both these contentions, while
plausible,31 are refuted by the old and useful fiction that an action against the tax
collector is a personal one and is not a suit against the United States; 82 therefore,
having a personal interest at stake, the collector is a proper defendant. A repudia-
tion of this fiction now would serve only to restrict and impair unnecessarily federal
declaratory procedure. Since the declaratory judgment offers unique opportunities
for service in the federal sphere, it is to be anticipated that the Supreme Court
will both recognize and preserve these opportunities by affirming the principal case
in its procedural aspect when it comes before that Court for decision.83
EFFECT OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION'S CERTIFICATE OF ABANDONMENT ON
RAILROAD'S CONTRACT TO MAINTAIN SERVICE
IN 1896 the Mantorville Railway and Transfer Company contracted to sell its
roadbed and franchises to the defendant, Chicago Great Western Railroad Company,
in consideration of the latter's agreement to furnish reasonable railroad facilities to
Mantorville, a village in Minnesota some nine miles off the defendant's main line.
After several years' disagreement with the village as to the adequacy of its service,1
29. Note 4, supra; see BoRcHARD, DELARATORY Juixmrxis (1934) 149 et seq.
30. Stewart v. Herten, 249 N. W. 552 (Neb. 1933), and cases therein cited; see also
cases cited in Note (1921) 12 A. L. R. 75, 91, and Note (1933) 87 A. L. R. 1219.
31. In suits involving the constitutionality of federal statutes, the interest of the United
States is clear. The interest of the collector is less obvious. Practically speaking, he has
none. Cf. Armour v. Roberts, 151 Fed. 846 (1907); Kinney v. Conant, 166 Fed. 720
(1909). It should be noted that his interest in suits such as the instant one is distinguish-
able from his interest in suits to enjoin some personal action on his part. See Fltts v.
McGhee, 172 U. S. 516, 529, 530 (1898).
32. See Sage v. United States, 250 U. S. 33, 36 (1918); Smietanka v. Indiana Steel Co.
257 U. S. 1, 4 (1921); but see Note (1922) 31 YALE L. 3. 537 for a sound criticism of
the latter.
33. Cf. Nashville, C., & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249 (1933) which sustained an
action brought in the state courts under virtually analogous circumstances.
1. The village procured a $9,000 penalty judgment in the state court in 1923, after
the railroad failed to comply with a mandatory order of the Minnesota Railroad and
Warehouse Commission to furnish service. This judgment was vacated upon the railroad's
agreeing with the village to conform to the order as modified by the stipulations of the
parties. It was this agreement, as well as the original contract, which was the basis of
the instant suit.
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the Chicago Great Western obtained from the Interstate Commerce Commission a
certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing the abandonment of the
branch,2 despite the protests of the village and of the Minnesota Railroad and Vare-
house Commission based on the contract and on a Minnesota statute.s Thereupon
the village sought in the state court to enjoin the abandonment, asking for damages
in the alternative. The railroad removed to the federal court, which dismissed the
suit without prejudice4 on the ground that it was a collateral attack on the order of
the Interstate Commerce Commission.5
Under the provisions of the Transportation Act of 1920,0 if the Commission cer-
tifies that "public convenience and necessity permit" a proposed abandonment,
7 the
applicant "may, without securing approval other than such certificate,"8 comply with
its terms. Since the federal authority is supreme insofar as interstate commerce
is concerned,9 a railroad which has obtained the Commission's approval need secure
no further permission from the state, whether required under state law l° or by
reason of a state charter."1 The principal case raises squarely the question of the
effect Congress intended the Commission's certificate to have on private contracts
of the carrier with respect to the line whose abandonment is proposed, a question
which the Supreme Court has expressly left undetermined in the only case to come
before it.' 2 The Commission's authorization of abandonment might have any one of
2. The Commission dismroed the contract and statute as "not controlling in determining
questions of public convenience and necessity." Chicago Great Western Rr. Co. Abandon-
ment, 202 I. C. C. 63, 66 (1934). The certificate was issued under 41 SxrT. 477-478
(1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 1, par. 18-20 (1929).
3. Ain. STAT. (Mlason, 1927) § 4637, providing that railroads shall operate at least
one passenger train daily through each county-seat on their lines.
4. Village of Mantorville v. Chicago Great Western Rr. Co., 8 F. Supp. 791 (D. Mnn.
1934). Dismissing on jurisdictional grounds, the court expressly declined to consider the
question of damages. See note 13, infra.
5. Suits to "enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend" any order of the Interstate Commerce
Commission must be brought in a special three-judge federal court, with the United States
joined as a party defendant. 36 STAT. 1149 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. § 46 (1927); 3S SrAT.
219-220 (1913), 28 U. S. C. A. §§ 47-48 (1927); Lainbert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore &
Ohio Rr. Co., 258 U. S. 377 (1922); Venner v. Michigan Central Rr. Co., 271 U. S.
127 (1926).
6. 41 STAT. 456 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. c. 1 (1929).
7. 41 STAT. 477 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 1, par. 18 (1929).
8. 41 STAT. 478 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 1, par. 20 (1929). The operation of the
abandonment provisions is discussed in Burgess, Federal Regulation of Raitray Maacge-
ment and Finance (1924) 37 HsAv. L. REv. 705 (requirements of abandonment); Hmtrmm,
TuE PRoBmr or WEAx RAILROADs (1929) 112 et seq. (analysis of causes of abandonment);
Trumbower, Railroad Abandonments and Additions (1926) 34 J. PoL. Eco:. 37 (statistics).
9. Gulf, Colo. & Sante F6 Ry. Co. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98 (1895); see Shroyer v.
Chicago, Rock Island & Gulf Ry. Co., ill Tex. 24, 27, 222 S. W. 1095, 1096 (1920).
10. Cf. Venner v. Mich. Central Rr. Co., 271 U. S. 127 (1926) (permiz-ive order
authorizing issuance of trust certificates); Nueces Valley Townsite Co. v. San Antonio,
Uvalde & Gulf Rr. Co., 123 Tex. 167, 67 S. W. (2d) 215 (1933) (permiLssive order author-
izing acquisition of control of one carrier by another).
11. Colorado v. United States, 271 U. S. 153 (1926) (the state did not -cceed in its
contention that the railroad could not abandon one part of its road and still continue to
enjoy the privilege granted by its charter of operating the rest of its line); cf. New Yorh
v. United States, 257 U. S. 591 (1922).
12. See Central New England Ry. Co. v. Boston & Albany Rr. Co., 279 U. S. 41s,
418 (1929) (enforcement of contract of abandoning railroad to pay $15,G00 annually to
plaintiff railroad for use of its tracks); cf. Nueces Valley Townsite Co. v. San Antonio,
Uvalde & Gulf Rr. Co., 123 Tex. 167, 67 S. W. (2d) 215 (1933), cited note 10, suPra.
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three possible effects on such contracts. The permission granted might completely
discharge the carrier of its contractual duties, or it might prevent a suit by the
promisee for specific performance without absolving the railroad of liability in dam-
ages for their breach, or it might not affect the carrier's contractual duties at all.
It is implicit in the court's dismissal without prejudice on the ground of "collateral
attack" that it considered the Commission's authorization a bar to a suit by the
town for a mandatory injunction without at the same time intending necessarily to
preclude a subsequent action for damages.13 Since, however, the railroad's privilege
may be rendered equally ineffectual by a high assessment of damages for abandon-
ment of service as by a decree compelling it to maintain service, it may be that the
court's holding results in precluding any future recovery by the plaintiff of such an
amount of damages, on the ground that such a recovery would similarly constitute
a "collateral attack" on the Commission's order. Thus, the plaintiff would be limited
in a subsequent action to such damages as would not in effect interfere with the exer-
cise of the privilege of abandonment granted it by the Commission, even though
greater damages were proved. On the other hand, it may be consistent with the
court's decision to allow full damages in such a subsequent action, irrespective of the
practical effect on the defendant's privilege. Thus, it might be argued that, while
an injunction against the railroad's exercise of its privilege would be a "collateral
attack" on the Commission's order, nevertheless, allowing full damages against it for
doing so would be merely enforcing thd plaintiff's contract without legally compelling
the defendant to maintain its service. Since either result would prevent plaintiffs
in all such cases from enforcing their contracts by injunctive decree, and since the
former result would, furthermore, limit their right to damages, the decision would in
either event seem to lay down a rule that the granting of a certificate of a public con-
venience and necessity by the Interstate Commerce Commission overrides the contrac-
tual rights of third parties to the extent that their enforcement would legally compel
the carrier to refrain from abandonment.
This analysis of the abandonment provisions of the Transportation Act overlooks
the dual nature of the defendant railroad's obligation to maintain service, and thus
unduly extends the effect of the Commission's certificate. Historically, the common
law duty of common carriers to serve all comers so long as they remained in busi-
ness14 was supplemented by state statutes requiring them to continue to serve unless
"public convenience and necessity" permitted an abandonment.15 The Transporta-
tion Act merely transferred the administration and supervision of this public duty
to the Interstate Commerce Commission; and since the Act states that no other
approval is necessary for a proposed abandonment, the Commission's authority is
plenary with respect to the public duty of any railroad subject to the Act.10  But
it does not follow from the Commission's authority to relieve a carrier of its public
duty that its power necessarily extends to an adjudication, direct or indirect, of any
13. Under such an interpretation of the law, there is no reason why the court could
not have dismissed the prayer for equitable relief, and, transferring the case to the legal
side of the docket, tried the action for damages in the same proceeding.
Communications from the attorneys in the principal case to the YALE LAW JOURNAL state
that the plaintiff has brought a new action in the state court for damages, which Is now
pending.
14. 1 MrrcnrE, CARuuzEs (1915) § I.
15. The duty of applying and construing the phrase was first placed on the courts and,
by later statutes, on the state public service commissions. Hypps, FmmAL R our aioN
OF RAILROAD CONSTRUCTON AND ABANDONMENT UNDER THE TRAnsPoRTA0xoN Acr or 1920
(1929) 7 et seq.
16. See Colorado v. United States, 271 U. S. 153, 168 (1926); Transit Comm. v.
United States, 289 U. S. 121, 127 (1933).
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private contractual obligation the road may have.' 7 The Commission's certificate
of public convenience and necessity is simply permissive, not mandatory.18 Its pur-
pose is merely to protect the public from ill-advised or improper abandonments rather
than to give the carrier carte blanche to abandon. It thus removes but one obstacle
in the way of the railroad's proposed abandonment, and neither authorizes nor ex-
cuses the breach of its private contract of service previously entered into.1 0 Although
it might be desirable, in view of the Congressional policy of centralizing full author-
ity in the Interstate Commerce Commission over the transportation system of the
country as a whole,20 that the Commission's authorization of abandonment be
paramount and unrestricted by private contracts affecting particular interests, an act
of Congress should not be construed to deprive a party to a contract of any of its
rights thereunder unless such intentions plainly appear in the act. In the absence of
such an express intention, an order of the Commission relieving a railroad of its public
duty should have no effect on its private obligations.
Under this interpretation of the Act, the town's suit could not be considered a
collateral attack on the Commission's order. It neither assailed the order nor im-
17. In Central New England Ry. Co. v. Boston & Albany Rr. Co., 279 U. S. 415, 419
(1929), which was an action on a contract to pay the plaintiff railroad $15,000 annually
for the use of its tracks, where the defendant railroad had abandoned the branch under
a certificate from the Interstate Commerce Commisson, the Supreme Court, although
granting damages, avoided the issue of the Commission's power over the contract, but said:
"To the suggestion of petitioner that, by force of the statute, the permisson to abandon
its line necessarily operated to cancel its obligation, regardless of the intention of the
Commission, we need only say that the statute contains no such provision nor any language
suggesting it. We need not decide whether such may be the effect of a proper order of
the Commission on contracts previously entered into by the carrier and not expressly
mentioned in the order, where the contract and the order necesmrily conflict. [Citing cases.]
But without such a conflict, there could be no justification for holding that the order
would also operate sub silentio to release a carrier from a contract merely because it has
ceased to be of value through compliance with the order." Cf. Nueces Valley Townaite
Co. v. San Antonio, Uvalde & Gulf Rr. Co., 123 Tex. 167, 67 S. W. (2d) 215 (1933),
cited note 10, supra. In Western Pacific Rr. Co. v. Nevada-California-Oregon Ry. Co.,
40 F. (2d) 731 (N. D. Cal. 1930), however, a certificate permitting the abandonment of
a portion of defendant's line which connected with plaintiff's was held a good defense to
an action for $500,000 damages for breach of a contract to exchange traffic, the court
assuming that the Interstate Commerce Commission has power, under the Transportation
Act of 1920, to authorize or "require" abandonment. Central New England Ry. Co. v.
Boston & Albany Er. Co., supra, was distinguished on the ground that the plaintiff had
not appeared in the hearing before the Commission. But cf. Colorado v. United States,
271 U. S. 153 (1926), cited note 11, supra.
18. Only two other provisions of the Transportation Act are permissive (see note 10,
supra), the rest mandatory.
19. Mandatory orders are much more likely to interfere with prior contracts than
permissive orders, yet it appears unsettled whether even mandatory orders automatically
cancel such obligations. See Central New England Ry. Co. v. Boston & Albany Rr. Co,
279 U. S. 415, 419 (1929), cited note 17, supra. Comment (1922) 22 COL. L. REv. S64.
20. Cf. InTsRTATiE Coia=c Ac, 24 STAT. 379 (1887), 49 U. S. C. A. c. 1 (1929);
TRAisPoRTATIOe AcT, 41 STAT. 456 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. c. 1 (1929); E1ra cs.acV Trv-s-
PORTATioN AcT, 48 STAT. 211 (1933), 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 250-267 (1934); see Dayton-Go02-2
Creek Ry. Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456, 478 (1924); Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Gulf, Colo. & Sante Fe Ry. Co., 270 U. S. 266, 277 (1926); Interstate Commerce Comm.
v. Ore.-Wash. Pr. and Navigation Co., 288 U. S. 14, 43 (1933) (di-sent by Cardozo, J.).
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pugned the Commission's determination of the public convenience and necessity
question. It was a suit on a contract, calling at the most for a construction of the
Commission's authority and the effect of its order, issues which were quite within
the jurisdiction of the state court and of the federal court on removal.2 1 It would
seem, therefore, that the Commission's certificate should not be held to limit the type
of relief available to an injured party under such contracts. The courts should thus
be able to grant a decree specifically enforcing such a contract; but since in many
cases the equities involved would not warrant such relief, the plaintiff's remedy would
be simply a recovery of whatever damages have been suffered. 22 The Commission's
certificate itself, however, should not be held to be a bar to a suit for a mandatory
injunction or to an action for damages.
THE POWER OF A STATE TO CONDEMN LAND FOR A FEDERAL PARK
CONGRESS in 1926 directed the Secretary of the Interior to accept as a gift on
behalf of the United States certain described lands in the state of Virginia, and
then to set them apart as the Shenandoah National Park.' In accordance with this
act, the Virginia legislature authorized its Commission on Conservation and Develop-
ment to acquire certain lands by gift, purchase, or condemnation, and then to give
them to the United States for this proposed National Park.2 The Commission,
under the power of eminent domain delegated to it by the Virginia act, proceeded
to condemn various parcels of land. The owner of one of these parcels resisted
this condemnation proceeding, contending that the Virginia act was unconstitutional
since the state was attempting to exercise its power of eminent domain not to benefit
the citizens of Virginia but rather to further the exclusively federal purpose of
creating a national park. The federal district court dismissed the plaintiff's bill on
the ground that, even though the federal government would own and administer the
park area for the use of the people of other states as well as Virginia, the exercise
21. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants' Elevator Co., 259 U. S. 285 (1922); see
Central New England Ry. Co. v. Boston & Albany Rr. Co., 279 U. S. 415, 420 (1929),
cited note 17, supra; Texas Steel Co. v. Mo., Kan. & Tex. Rr. Co., 70 S. W. (2d) 484,
485 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934). The Interstate Commerce Act saves all remedies existing at
common law. 25 STAT. 862 (1889), 49 U. S. C. A. § 22, par. 1 (1929). Even If the
Commission had attempted to adjudicate the contractual obligations, so much of Its order
would have been void as an extra-jurisdictional act of an administrative board. Cf. Little
Falls Fibre Co. v. Henry Ford 8 Son, Inc., 249 N. Y. 495, 502, 164 N. E. 558, 561 (1928),
aff'd, 280 U. S. 369 (1930). But the Commission has, in fact, never purported to adjudicate
contractual obligations in connection with its issuance of certificates of public convenience
and necessity. The statement of the Commission cited in note 2, supra, merely evidenced
its intention to consider solely the public question, unaffected by any independent commit-
ment.
22. See Beasley v. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 191 U. S. 492, 497 ( 1903). The measure of
damages may be a difficult problem. The Commission's certificate precludes a judgment
on the penal sum (see note 1, supra) provided by state law (see note 10, supra). But
damages need not be measured with perfect exactness. RSTATEm T, CoUiRACTS (1932)
§ 331; see Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Marshall, 136 U. S. 393, 405 (1890). Moreover, the
railroad may possibly be able to prove that it has completely performed its obligation under
the contract by having furnished service for a reasonable length of time.
1. 44 STAT. 616 (1926), 16 U. S. C. A. §§ 403, 403a (Supp. 1934).
2. VA. CoDE (Michle 1930) § 585 (52-58).
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of the power of eminent domain in this manner directly promoted the general
welfare of the citizens of Virginia. 3
Since the power of eminent domain is an inherent attribute of sovereignty which
may be exercised by each sovereignty only to effectuate its powers, 4 it follows that
the federal government has the power of eminent domain only for federal purposes
while the state government has this power only for state purposes.P Since the
use of the power of eminent domain is predicated upon necessity, it has been said
that the reason for its use fails when one sovereignty takes for the benefit of another
sovereignty.6 Nevertheless, states have often used their powers of eminent domain
for the benefit of the federal government,7 and such use has rarely been held
unconstitutional. When the condemnation was clearly for a federal purpose,
this use of power has been justified on the theory that it was not improper for the
state to act when the federal government could have condemned the land itsel
In such a situation, to refuse to allow the state to condemn land would serve no
purpose but to force a second condemnation proceeding by the federal government.
However, the argument most often advanced for this use of eminent domain by a
state is that its citizens still get the principal benefit while the federal government
only receives an incidental benefit.0 This is conclusive in a project for improvement
of navigation within a state,' 0 or perhaps even for the construction of a federal
fort to protect a harbour." And it is of weight even in a federal project such
as a post-office' 2 or a naval-station2 3 In these cases, the federal government is
3. Via v. State Commission on Conservation, etc., 9 F. Supp. 556 (W. D. Va. 1935). A
similar case arose in the state courts of Virginia, and was decided the same way. Rudasle
v. State Commission, 155 Va. 803, 156 S. E. 829 (1931). This Act of Congress creating
the Shenandoah National Park also provided for the Great Smoky Mountains National
Park, which was to be located partly in Tennessee and partly in North Carolina. Simlar
litigation arose in the courts of each state, and the same result was reached. State v.
Oliver, 162 Tenn. 100, 35 S. W. (2d) 396 (1931); Yarborough v. Park CommiTion, 195
N. C. 284, 145 S. E. 563 (1928).
4. Cherokee Nation v. Kansas Rr. Co., 135 U. S. 641 (1890); see United States v.
Jones, 109 U. S. 513, 518 (1893); 1 LFwis, EM a-ErN Dolt= (3d ed. 1909) § 3; 1
NrcoLs, EainTW Do =sUn (2d ed. 1917) § 17.
5. Under this reasoning, it has been held that a state cannot acquire by eminent
domain land for a federal post-office. Darlington v. United States, 82 Pa. 382 (1876); cf.
People ex. rel. Trombley v. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471 (1871) (federal light-hous").
6. People ex rel. Trombley v. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471 (1871).
7. Harris v. Elliott, 10 Pet. 25 (U. S. 1836) (navy-yard); Grangeville Highway Dkzt.
v. A1hie, 49 Idaho 603, 290 Pac. 717 (1930) (highway); Reddall v. Bryan, 14 Md. 444
(1859) (water for federal capitol); Orr v. Quimby, 54 N. H. 590 (1374) (coast-survey);
United States v. Dumplin Island, 1 Barb. 24 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1847) (light-house).
8. United States v. 2,271.29 Acres, 31 F. (2d) 617 (W. D. Wis. 1928) (game refuge
pursuant to treaty with Great Britain); In the Matter of Petition of United States, 96
N. Y. 227 (1884) (improvement of Harlem river); Lancey v. King County, 15 Wash. 9,
45 Pac. 645 (1896) (ship canal to Puget sound).
9. United States v. 2,271.29 Acres, 31 F. (2d) 617 (W. D. Wis. 1928); In the Matter
of Petition of United States, 96 N. Y. 227 (1884); State ex rel. Thomas Furniture Co. v.
Milwaukee, 156 Wis. 549, 146 N. W. 775 (1914) (Milwaukee harbour); se Rockaway
Pacific Corp. v. Stotesbury, 255 Fed. 345, 352 (N. D. N. Y. 1917) (public defense).
10. Lancey v. King County, 15 Wash. 9, 45 Pac. 645 (1896).
11. Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229 (1861).
12. Burt v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 106 Mass. 356 (1871). But see 1 Nrcnos, Er=,-nr
DoarAnm § 34.
13. In the Matter of League Island, 1 Brewst. 524 (Comm. Pleas Pa. 163); see 1
LEwis, E -z.Tr Doara-- § 309.
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regarded as but an agent in fulfilling the purpose of the state.11 It is interesting
to note that in each situation in which the state's use of eminent domain for the
federal government has been upheld, the federal government itself had the power to
accomplish the same result without the consent of the state, though the courts
usually disregard this fact.
If it is assumed that the federal government has the power to condemn land for
a federal park, then the holding of the principal case is easily justified by the
argument that no purpose is served by forcing the federal government to exercise its
own power in a second proceeding. But this assumption is a questionable one.
While states may condemn land for public parks under their police powers,
14 it is
not yet settled whether any constitutional provision empowers the federal govern-
ment to condemn private lands for this purpose,1' since most of the existing federal
parks were either withdrawn from the public domain 1' or were acquired by gift
17
or purchase.' 8 In view of this situation, the principal case takes on a new
significance. It points out a method for the creation of new federal parks in the
future which avoids the necessity of testing the extent of the federal power to
acquire land for parks by eminent domain. But, in addition, it suggests the
principle that a state may exercise its power of eminent domain to further a
purpose which the federal government alone cannot achieve by eminent domain,
As long as the state itself is materially benefited, as it was in the principal case,
there seems no reason for not allowing a state its use of eminent domain in this
manner.19 This principle has been applied as between states. It is not unusual for
one state to use its power of eminent domain for the benefit of the citizens of another
14. Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S. 282 (1893); see Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles,
262 U. S. 700, 707, 708 (1923); 1 LEwis, EMINENT DOMAiw § 271; 1 NicnOLS, § 56.
15. It is reasonable to infer from several cases that the federal power of eminent
domain exists only for those purposes which are essential to the existence of the federal
government, such as post-offices, court-houses, custom-houses, etc. See Pollard et al. v.
Hagan et al., 3 How. 212, 223 (U. S. 1845) ; Kohl et al. v. United States, 91 U. S, 367, 372
(1875); Cherokee Nation v. Kansas Rr. Co., 135 U. S. 641, 656 (1890); Chappell v.
United States, 160 U. S. 499, 509, 510 (1896); Burley v. United States, 179 Fed. 1, 9
(C. C. A. 9th, 1910). But cf. United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Rr. Co., 160 U. S. 668
(1896); United States v. Graham & Irvine, 250 Fed. 499 (W. D. Va. 1917) (federal govern-
ment can acquire by eminent domain forest watershed lands for purpose of preserving
navigability of navigable streams); see United States v. Certain Lands in City of
Louisville, 9 F. Supp. 137, 138 (W. D. Ky. 1935); Rudacille v. State Commission, 155
Va. 808, 822, 823, 156 S. E. 829, 834 (1931). The general welfare clause of the
constitution probably does not add to the federal government's powers in this respect.
See United States v. Boyer, 85 Fed. 425 (W. D. Mo. 1898); United States v. Certain Lands
in City of Louisville, 9 F. Supp. 137 (W. D. Ky. 1935); 2 COOLEY, CosISnTUTIONA,
LrrAnoxs 1112; 1 STORY, COMMENTARES ON CoNsT TuTioN (5th ed. 1891) § 911. But
cf. Missouri Utilities Co. v. City of California, 8 F. Supp. 454 (W. D. Mo. 1934); CoRwI,
THE TWILIGHT OF TE SUPRF.A COURT (1934) 149 ff.; LAWSON, THE GENERAL WEFARtn
CLAUSE (1926).
16. 17 STAT. 32 (1872), 16 U. S. C. A. § 21 (1926) (Yellowstone National Park)
36 STAT. 354 (1910), 16 U. S. C. A. § 161 (1926) (Glacier National Park); see 16 U. S,
C. A. § 1-470 (1926) for the other parks which were created in this manner.
17. 39 STAT. 385 (1916), 16 U. S. C. A. § 211 (1926) (Abraham Lincoln National Park),
18. 32 STAT. 655 (1902), 16 U. S. C. A. § 151 (1926) (Platt National Park).
19. The court in the principal case relied upon the fact that the state of Virginia would
be materially benefited by the proposed park. This was also stressed in the three related
cases cited in note 3, supra.
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state.20 If this use of eminent domain is sanctioned as between states, it should
surely be allowed as between the state and the federal government, since the latter
relationship is much more intimate than the former.
If the notion of the federal government as one of limited powers persists in the
courts, the principal case points out an easy means of circumventing this con-
stitutional limitation. Since the state power of eminent domain is practically
unlimited, being restricted only by the broad concept of "public use," the federal
government can receive the benefits of the use of this power of the state, and thus
can acquire lands which could not be obtained by federal condemnation, as, for
example, land for a housing project.2  Following the method illustrated in the
principal case, the state could acquire such lands and then grant them to the federal
government. This might well be applied also to lands for federal non-military
educational institutions or hospitals, or perhaps for federal power projects.
EFFECT OF ExECUTOR's DEFALCATION ON PRIOR AsSIGNMENT OF HIS LEGACy
A REsmuARY legatee who was also the executor of the will assigned his legacy, worth
about $1,000, to secure a promissory note on which his liability was in excess of
$1,500. Subsequently, as executor, he misappropriated funds of the estate to his own
use, for which he was removed, and an administrator with the will annexed was
appointed in his place. In the settlement of the estate in the surrogate court the
executor was surcharged with the amount of his misappropriation, and the adminis-
trator was permitted to deduct that amount from the executor's legacy before paying
it to the assignee.1
Where an executor who commits devastavit 2 is also a legatee, as much of his
legacy may be retained upon the final settlement of the estate as is necessary
to satisfy the amount of his liability 3 Thus the indebtedness arising from the
20. Rogers v. Toccoa Elec. Power Co., 163 Ga. 919, 137 S. E. 272 (1927) (Georgia
land for reservoir from which electric power is taken chiefly for citizens of Tennesse);
In the Matter of Townsend, 39 N. Y. 171 (1868) (New York land for reservoir from
which water is taken solely for a New Jersey canal); Carnegie Nat. Gas. Co. v. Swiger, 72
W. Va. 557, 79 S. E. 3 (1913) (land for inter-state pipe-line); see Langdon v. City of
Walla Walla, 112 Wash. 446, 464, 193 Pac. 1, 7 (1920) (Washington land for water-
supply solely for an Oregon municipality). Contra: Grover Irr. Co. v. Lovella Ditch Co.,
21 Wyo. 204, 131 Pac. 43 (1913) (Wyoming land for head-gate of irrigation ditch for
sole use of Colorado).
21. United States v. Certain Lands in City of Louisville, 9 F. Supp. 137 (W. D.
Ky. 1935.)
1. In re Shanaburgh's Estate, 277 N. Y. Supp. 689 (Surr. Ct. 1935).
2. At common law the writ of devastavit was the remedy against the executor for breach
of his duty, and though in the United States today the executor is held to account by the
probate courts, the term devastavit is still used to denote any act for which the executor
becomes personally liable to the estate. 3 WomNnur, AammcA.1 LAw or ADi=mIs TO io:;
(3rd ed. 1923) § 534; 3 ScnouLEr, Wn.rs, E.cuToRs, AD A =r.smToros (6th ed. 1923)
§ 2488.
3. Lambright v. Lamnbright, 74 Ohio St. 193, 78 N. E. 265 (1906); Stanley v. United
States Nat. Bank, 110 Ore. 648, 224 Pac. 835 (1924); Henry v. Fiske, 11 R. I. 318 (1876);
See Young v. Schelly, 21 AUt. 1049 (N. J. Eq. 1891); Grant v. Edwards, 92 N. C. 447
(1885). This is equally true where a testamentary trustee is a legatee. Sims v. Doughty,
5 Ves. 243 (Ch. 1800); Doering v. Doering, 42 Ch. D. 203 (1889) (trustee acquired in-
terest by assignment from original beneficiary). And also where an administrator is a
distributee. Gosnell v. Flack, 76 Md. 423, 25 At. 411 (1892).
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devastavit is treated just as any indebtedness of an ordinary legatee, whose legacy
may always be retained insofar as is necessary to satisfy his debt to the estate,
4
Where either an ordinary legatee or a legatee who is also executor has assigned his
legacy, the right of the estate to retain the legacy to satisfy any indebtedness of
the legatee is not affected by the assignment as long as the indebtedness was in-
curred prior to notice of the assignment by the assignee.5 In the case of a debt
to the estate incurred by an ordinary legatee after his assignee has given notice of
the assignment of the legacy, no right to retain the legacy to satisfy the indebted-
ness exists, because the legacy no longer belongs to the legatee, and under the rules
relating to assignments an assignee takes subject only to those defences and equities
existing against the assignor at the time when the assignee gives notice of the assign-
ment.6 The latter rule would seem to bar the right of the estate to retain the legacy
of an executor in satisfaction of a devastavit committed subsequent to the assignment,
but, as in the principal case, the courts make an exception and allow the estate to
retain as much of the legacy as is necessary to satisfy the deficiency. In England
this result is firmly established, 7 and though in the United States the precise situa-
tion of a devastavit subsequent to an assignment has rarely arise, the general ten-
dency seems to be to follow the English decisions 8
In those cases and in others involving the very similar situation of a trustee who
is also a beneficiary of the trust, several theories have been advanced in an attempt
to explain the result without violating the rules applicable to assignments. One
frequent explanation is that when an executor commits devastavit, he is presumed to
have received his legacy immediately by anticipation, and therefore, having paid
4. Although the legatee could be sued by the estate for the debt, equity intervenes to
prevent circuity of actions. Chase Nat. Bank v. Sayles, 30 F. (2d) 178 (D. R. 1. 1927);
Thompson v. McCune, 333 Mo. 758, 63 S. W. (2d) 41 (1933). The cases dealing with the
general nature of the right of retainer are collected in (1919) 1 A. L. R. 991; (1924) 30
A. L. R. 775; (1931) 75 A. L. R. 878. See also 3 WomER, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 563,
564.
5. Chase Nat. Bank v. Sayles, 30 F. (2d) 178 (D. R. I. 1927) (executor-legatee);
Courtenay v. Williams, 3 Tlare 539 (Ch. 1844) (ordinary legatee); Jenkinson v. N. Y.
Finance Co., 79 N. J. Eq. 247, 82 Atl. 36 (1911) (trustee-beneficiary); Smith v. Kearney,
2 Barb. Ch. 533 (N. Y. 1848) (administrator-distributee).
6. Bobo v. Vaiden, 20 S. C. 271 (1883); Stephens v. Venables, 30 Beav. 625 (Ch. 1862).
2 WILUIAMS, EXIDCUrORS A AWM TRATORS (12th ed. 1930) 851, 852. But cf. Trader'
Bank v. Dennis' Estate, 221 S. W. 796 (Mo. 1920), in which it was held that the estate
could retain an heir's interest as against the assignee of the interest where an indebtednes3
of the heir to the estate arose subsequent to the assignment as a result of the estate's ll't-
bility as the heir's surety. The heir's insolvency may have affected the decision. See inlra
note 16.
7. Morris v. Livie, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 380 (Ch. 1842); Barnett v. Sheffield, 1 De G. M. &
G. 371 (Ch. 1852) (testamentary trustee also a beneficiary); Re Hervey, 61 L. T. R. (N.
S.) 429 (Ch. D. 1889) (administrator also a distributee); In re Paine (1919) 1 Ch. 38.
But where a legatee has assigned his interest in the estate before becoming a fiduciary, the
estate has no right to retain that interest to satisfy a devastavit. Irby v. Irby (No. 3),
25 Beav. 632 (Ch. 1858); see In re Paine (1919) 1 Ch. 38, 47.
8. See Clapp v. Meserole, 1 Keyes 281, 288 (N. Y. 1864), 1 Abb. App. Dec. 362, 368
(N. Y. 1864); Stanley v. U. S. Nat. Bank, 110 Ore. 648, 658, 224 Pac. 835, 840 (1924);
Belknap v. Belknap, 5 Allen 468, 471 (Mass. 1862) (trustee-beneficiary); Hart's Estate
No. 5), 203 Pa. 503, 507, 53 At. 373, 374 (1902) (trustee remainderman at termination
of trust); cf. Bally's Estate, 156 Pa. 634, 27 Atl. 560 (1893). But ef. Muller v. Nat.
Surety Co., 91 Misc. 544, 154 N. Y. Supp. 1096 (Sup. Ct. 1915), aff'd in memo. op., 172
App. Div. 966, 157 N. Y. Supp. 1137 (1916).
himself, neither he nor his assignee has any claim to assert against the estate at the
final distribution. 9 This explanation seems inadequate unless it is presumed in addi-
tion that the taking by anticipation relates back to the time the legatee became
executor,10 for it is the very fact that the assignment was made prior to the devastavit
which makes an explanation of the result necessary. A second theory is that at the
time a legatee becomes executor, his legacy becomes subject to the possibility of a
right accruing in the estate to deduct from it the amount of any indebtedness re-
sulting from a future devastavit, and his assignee takes subject to this possibility.'
Some courts regard as unnecessary the confusion created by speaking of a possible
future right as an existing right and suggest that it may be avoided by regarding
the right of a legatee who is also executor to payment of his legacy as being condi-
tional upon his proper performance of his duty as executor.12 Since the right to
payment is conditional in the hands of the legatee, its transfer to an assignee cannot
free it of that condition, especially since at the date of the assignment there is no
immediate right to payment of the legacy.j
This treatment of the situation involved in the principal case is adequately sup-
ported by analogous decisions concerning the assignment of contractual rights. 'Where-
ever a defense or equity of the debtor against the assignor arises from a right in-
herent in the contract by its very terms, that defense or equity is valid against the
assignee though acquired after he has given notice of the assignment. Thus, if pay-
ments not presently due under a bilateral executory contract are assigned, the failure
of the assignor subsequent to the assignment to perform his duties under the con-
tract gives the debtor a valid defense or equity against the assignee, for the assignor's
right to payment being conditional on his own performance, his assignee can get no
higher right from the mere fact of having given notice of the assignment to the
debtor.14 One step removed from this type of case is that where performance by the
debtor is presently due, as illustrated by the situation in which a construction con-
tractor has assigned interim payments already due him on his contract, and then
subsequent to the assignment refuses to complete the construction. In such cases it
9. Irby v. Irby (No. 3), 25 Beav. 632 (Ch. 1858); Jacubs v. Rylance, L. R. 17 Eq.
341 (1874) (executor's legacy was derivative); In re Dacre, (1916) 1 Ch. 344 (executor's
legacy was derivative); see Stanley v. U. S. Nat. Bank, 110 Ore. 648, 658, 224 Pac. 835,
840 (1924); Doering v. Doering, 42 Ch. D. 203, (1889); In re Towndrow, (1911) 1 Ch.
662, 666, 668; In re Paine, (1919) 1 Ch. 38, 46.
10. This additional presumption is vaguely implied in a few cases. In re Towndrow
(1911) 1 Ch. 662, 666; In re Dacre, (1916) 1 Ch. 344, 348.
11. Morris v. Livie, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 380 (Ch. 1842); Barnett v. Sheffield, 1 De. G. MI.
& G. 371 (Ch. 1852); Re Hervey, 61 L. T. R. (N. S.) 429 (Ch. D. 1889).
12. Morris v. Livie, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 380 (Ch. 1842); In re Paine (1919) 1 Ch. 38; s e
Baily's Estate, 156 Pa. 634, 641, 27 At. 560, 562 (1893); Barnett v. Sheffield, 1 De G. L.
& G. 371, 381 (Ch. 1852); cf. Central Trust Co. of N. Y. v. West India Improvement Co.,
169 N. Y. 314, 323, 62 N. E. 387, 390 (1901).
13. See Deobald v. Opperman, 111 N. Y. 531, 538; 19 N. E. 94, 96 (1888); 4 S oUX=,
op. cit. s-pra note 2, § 3066.
14. Southern Surety Co. v. Merchants' & Farmers' Bank of Avilla, 203 Ind. 173, 176
N. E. 846 (1931); People v. Third Nat. Bank of Syracuse, 159 N. Y. 382, 54 N. E. 35
(1899); National Nassau Bank of N. Y. v. I. M. Ludington's Sons, 164 App. Div. 466,
149 N. Y, Supp. 967 (1914); Beavers v. Cons. Oil Co., 31 S. W. (2d) 876 (TeM. Ct. Civ.
App. 1930); 1 WxrsrOmN, CoxmACrrs § 433, and cases cited therein, n. 90; cf. Florida Eat
Coast Ry. Co. v. Eno, 99 Fla. 887, 128 So. 622 (1930) ; Joly v. Stoneman, 271 MassZ. 352,
171 N. E. 470 (1930); Appeal of Lancaster County Nat. Bank, 304 Pa. 437, 155 Aft. 859
(1931); R sTATE muT, CoxTRscrs (1932) § 167(1), mustration (3); 2 Po.amoy, EQg
JupspRuDEmE (4th ed. 1918) § 704.
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has been held that the debtor is entitled to recoup or counterclaim for his damages
arising from the contractor's default out of the payments due the assignee. 15 Sim.
ilarly, a debtor has been permitted to assert the assignor's breach of warranty against
the assignee of the claim, even though the breach of warranty did not occur till
after the debtor had notice of thq assignment.' 0 The import of these cases is that
where interconnected rights and duties are involved, the assignee cannot enforce the
right when the duty has been breached. Applying this analysis to the instant situa-
tion, from the time a legatee becomes executor he is under a duty to perform his
functions properly, a duty on an equal if not higher plane than a contractual duty.
As legatee he has a right to payment of his legacy upon the final distribution. There
seems to be adequate reason in the policy of protecting decedents' estates from de-
faulting executors to hold that a sufficient connection exists between the duty and
the right so that the latter is conditional upon the former. Then, since the assigning
executor-legatee's right to payment is a conditional right, it can have no better
status in the hands of his assignee.
Moreover, from a practical point of view the result reached in the principal and
similar cases seems desirable. The assignee is not left without a remedy, for in the
principal case, having merely taken the assignment as security for the assignor's
liability on a pre-existing promissory note, the assignee can still sue on the note. If
the assignee had been a purchaser of the legacy he could still sue the assigning execu-
tor on the latter's implied warranty that he will do nothing to defeat the assigned
claim, for the executor's devastavit has clearly operated to defeat the claim.17 Of
course, should the assignor be insolvent, the assignee will be the one to suffer, but
even in such a case it appears desirable to protect the estate in preference to the
assignee, particularly since there is little reason to encourage the alienability of
legacies. In many states the policy of protecting decedents' estates from being dissi-
pated by defaulting executors is reflected in statutes requiring executors to give bond,
just as must administrators. Hence, it would seem reasonable that where the
testator, by giving the executor a legacy, has himself provided a fairly effective device
by which the estate will be protected from losses arising from a devastavit, the
executor should not be allowed, by merely assigning his legacy, to immunize the
legacy from liability to the estate for devastavit, and thus to defeat its purpose.
15. Citizens' Bank of Waynesboro v. Timmons, 19 Ga. App. 480, 91 S. E. 1050 (1917);
American Bridge Co. v. Boston, 202 Mass. 374, 88 N. E. 1089 (1909); Seibert v. Dunn,
216 N. Y. 237, 110 N. E. 447 (1915); see Government of Newfoundland v. Newfoundland
Rr. Co., 13 App. Cas. 199, 211, 212 (1888); Young v. Kitchin, 3 Ex. D. 127 (1878);
Dahlhjelm Garages Inc. v. Mercantile Ins. Co., 149 Wash. 184, 189, 270 Pac. 434, 436 (1928).
But cf. Stoddart v. Union Trust Co., (1912) 1 K. B. 181, 189 (assignor induced obligor
to enter into contract by fraud); In re Milan Tramways Co., 22 Ch. D. 122 (1882) (mi.
feasance of defendant as corporate director not sufficiently connected with derivative claim
against corporation).
16. Rosenthal v. Rambo, 165 Ind. 584, 76 N. E. 404 (1905). Further illustrations of
the allowance of an equitable right of set-off are afforded by the situation where a debtor
is surety for his creditor in some other transaction, and the creditor assigns the debt. After
the assignee has given notice to the debtor, the debtor is then held liable as surety. In a
suit by the assignee some decisions allow the debtor to set off the amount of his liability
as surety against the assignee's claim. First State Bank of Palmyra v. Cooper, 223 111. App.
412 (1921); Eigenmann v. Clark, 21 Ind. App. 129, 51 N. E. 725 (1898); ,VATm.iiM,
SET-OFF (2nd ed. 1872) § 435. But cf. Fern v. Wickham, 135 N. Y. 223, 31 N. E. 1028
(1892). However, in those cases where the set-off is allowed, it will usually be found
that the assignor is insolvent.
17. REsTATEmENT, CorTRicrs (1932) § 175 (1) (a).
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POWER OF SECOND MORTGAGEE TO ENJOIN FORECLOSURE BY FIRST MORTGAGME
UNDER SECTION 74 OF THE BANxRuPTcY ACT
AFTER plaintiff partnership, one-fifth of whose assets consisted of second mort-
gages on improved real estate, had obtained an extension of time within which to
pay its debts under Section 74 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1 the holders of four of the
first mortgages commenced foreclosure proceedings. In order to prevent the wiping
out of its second mortgages, plaintiff sought to enjoin the foreclosure proceedings on
the ground that the time of payment of the first mortgage claims had been extended
along with the extension which they had procured for their other debts. The plaintiff
based its petition on those provisions of Section 74 which for the purposes of an ex-
tension define a debt as a claim, of whatever character, against the debtor or his
property, and a creditor as the holder of any claim, of whatever character, against
the debtor or his property whether or not provable under the Act; 2 and which permit
secured debts to be included within an extension when the security for the debt is
within the actual or constructive possession of the debtor.? Plaintiffs contended that,
within the scope of these comprehensive definitions, the first mortgagees held a claim
against the property of the second mortgagee, and thus, as creditors of the partnership,
they should be enjoined from foreclosing upon their respective mortgages. But the
Circuit Court of Appeals denied the plaintiff's request for an injunction, holding that
the real estate sought to be foreclosed was not the plaintiff's property within the
definition of property under Section 74, since under Pennsylvania law the strict "title
theory of mortgages" does not obtain, and therefore the legal title to the property
did not pass to the second mortgagee.4
Where the mortgagor has himself secured an extension of the first mortgage lien,
the problem of the instant case will not arise, since the second mortgagee is bene-
fited indirectly. But where the mortgagor has not acted to prevent foreclosure, the
question arises whether or not the second mortgagee may be afforded direct protection
under Section 74. One argument against affording such protection is that the second
mortgage often represents no equity in the property from the outset and is but a
speculative interest, the holder of which has been adequately compensated for his
risks by a higher rate of interest and other possible bonuses.n However, this attitude
completely disregards such situations as the principal case, for examule, where the
second mortgages are purchase money mortgages representing a builder's legitimate
profit, and issued against a real equity in the real estate which has by reason of un-
1. 47 S'AT. 1467 (1933); 11 U. S. C. A. § 202 (1934). Section 74 entitled "Composi-
tions and Extensions" is one of the three amendments added to the Bankruptcy Act in an
attempt at providing relief from the consequences of the depression and to prevent the
continued liquidation which was driving already depressed values still lower. This s-ction
affords relief to individual, non-corporate, debtors who cannot meet their maturing
obligations, with the view towards enabling them to avoid bankruptcy and the conse-
quent liquidation. Thus the petitioner under Section 74 is not called a "bankrupt" but a
"debtor" and an opportunity is offered him by means of an extension to avert liquidation
and effect rehabilitation. Garrison, The New Bankruptcy Amendments (1933) 8 Wis.
L. Rv. 291; Weinstein, Chapter VIII of the Bankruptcy Act (1933) 38 Co-. mcsx L. J.
171; Kinnane, Some Aspects of Section 74 (1934) 9 NoT= DAar LAWVMa 291.
2. Section 74(a), 11 U. S. C. A. § 202(a) (1934). These comprehensive definitions
of "debts" and "creditors" are applicable only for the purposes of an extension. Leal.
(1933) 33 COL. L. Rav. 704, 712.
3. Sec. 74(h), 11 U. S. C. A. § 202(h) (1934). Protection is afforded to the secured
creditor in 74(i): "Such extension shall not reduce the amount of or impair the lien of
any secured creditor, but shall affect only the time and method of its liquidation."
4. Brunn v. Wichser 75 F. (2d) 25 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1934).
5. See REEP, SErCOND ,oAGES AND L.M COMACrS (1928) 5-13, 12-14, 20-21, 66-33.
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foreseen events perhaps temporarily disappeared. 6 Moreover, if the mortgagor, who
in many instances had from the beginning no real stake in the property, is given
protection, it would seem that the second mortgagee, whose claim on the property is
precedent to that of the mortgagor, and who often had a, much larger real stake in
it from the beginning, should be protected.
The second mortgagee seeking relief under Section 74 is faced by several obstacles.
First, it must be shown that the second mortgagee has "property" upon which the
first mortgage is a "claim," thus rendering the second mortgagee a "debtor" to the
first mortgagee within the meaning of the section.2 Secondly, it must be determined
whether the wording of the statute, allowing extension of secured debts where the
security for the debt is within the actual or constructive possession of the debtor,
would require the second mortgagee to prove himself to be in such possession in
order to gain the protection of the section. Thirdly, if such proof were required,
can the second mortgagee be said to be in such "constructive possession" of the
mortgaged real estate, despite the actual possession by the mortgagor, as to bring
him within Section 74?3
It would seem that the second mortgagee has "property" subject to the "claim"
of the first mortgagee, sufficient to render the former a "debtor" under Section 74,
and thus entitled to an extension of the first mortgage claim. For, while the second
mortgagee may not hold legal title to the mortgaged premises, Section 74 does not
require that the "debtor" qualifying for relief have legal title, but requires merely
that he have "property." And the concept of "property" within the meaning of the
Bankruptcy Act is not limited to legal title, but is given "the broadest possible" in-
terpretation. 7 Thus, the fact that the second mortgagee is entitled to possession of
the real estate s and may bring ejectment based on that right,0 and in addition may
collect the rents and profits of the real estate to apply them against his claim,10 would
seem to be a sufficient interest in "property" to bring his interest within the meaning of
"property" in Section 74.11 When the second mortgage is thus viewed as a property
interest in the real estate within the meaning of Section 74, it becomes evident in
those cases where the foreclosure sale value of the real estate sought to be fore-
closed does not, as in the principal case, exceed the value of the first mortgage, that
the first mortgage is a "claim" upon the property interest belonging to the second
mortgagee, in the sense that the enforcement of the first mortgage will destroy the
6. McMichael, Real Estate Values (1930) 148 ANNAtS 170, 171; Holden, Real Estate Out-
look (1930) BUmDING AND LoAN ANNUAL 29, 34.
7. See In re Baudonine, 96 F. 536, 540 (S. D. N. Y., 1899); Earle v. Maxwell, 86 S. C.
1, 7; 67 S. E. 962, 964 (1910). Rather does "property" signify a set of legal relations
capable of transfer or sale. See In re Wright, 157 F. 544, 545 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1907); In
re Seiffert 18 F. (2d) 444, 445 (D. Mont., 1926); see also Section 70(a) 5 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 30 STAT. 565 (1898); 11 U. S. C. A. § 110 (a) 5 (1927); Schnebly, Restraints
Upon Alienation 1 (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 961. The second mortgage interest is transferable.
See Phillips v. Lewistown Bank, 18 Pa. 394, 402 (1852); 3 REMNGTON, BANXRUPc" (3d
ed. 1923) 82.
8. Randall v. Jersey Mortgage Co., 306 Pa. 1, 158 At]. 865 (1932); Tyson v. Munson,
77 Pa. 250; Bulger v. Wilderman and Pleet, 101 Pa. Super. 168 (1931). See also 2 JoNES,
MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) 186.
9. Tyson v. Munson, 77 Pa. 250 (1874); Bulger v. Wilderman and Pleet, 101 Pa. Super,
168 (1931) ; see Erny v. Sauer, 234 Pa. 330, 334, 83 Atl. 205, 206 (1912).
10. Randall v. Jersey Mortgage Co., 306 Pa. 1, 158 AtI. 865 (1932); Bulger v. Wilder-
man and Pleet, 101 Pa. Super. 168 (1931); Comment (1934) 8 T=.rpLE L. Q, 391, 400.
11. The second mortgagee may also maintain a bill in equity for an Injunction to re-
strain waste. Real Estate Trust Co. v. Hatton, 194 Pa. 449, 45 AtI. 379 (1900); see
Knoll v. N. Y. etc. R. R. Co., 121 Pa. 467, 473, 15 AtI. 571, 572 (1888).
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second.' 2 It follows that the second mortgagee may be said to be a "debtor" within
the definition of that term in Section 74. For, although there is no contractual rela-
tion between the first and second mortgagees, so that the alleged "debtor" is not per-
sonally liable on the claim of the first mortgagee, nevertheless, for the purposes of
the extension of debts under Section 74, privity of contract and personal liability do
not seem to be essentiaL'3 Thus, in certain analogous situations, such as where a
grantee of real estate has not assumed the payment of the mortgage upon the con-
veyed property, or where the satisfaction of the mortgage is limited to proceeds
from the sale of the real estate, and on which no deficiency judgment therefore can
be obtained,14 it is evident that Section 74 would be available to afford protection to
the grantee and mortgagor, respectively, even though the mortgage claim is only
against the property interest, and not enforceable personally against the possessor of
the interest It would seem unreasonable, therefore, to deny the second mortgagee
relief in the instant case on the ground of lack of privity of contract with the first
mortgagee.
Once it has been demonstrated that the second mortgagee is a "debtor" of the
first mortgagee within the meaning of Section 74, it would seem unnecessary that the
second mortgagee in order to obtain relief prove himself to be in "constructive pos-
session" of the mortgaged promises, that is, in constructive possession of the security
for the "debt" to the first mortgagee.' For the legislative history of the Section
indicates that the requirement of possession of the security by the debtor was in-
tended solely to prevent Section 74 from being applied to deprive pledgees of im-
mediate power of sale of the collateral pledged with them.'0 Thus, after it is shown,
as in the present case, that the "security," or, in other words, the mortgaged premises,
are not in the possession of the first mortgagee, the purpose of the statutory require-
ment is satisfied;' 7 so that it becomes immaterial whether the "security" is in the
hands of the mortgagor, or the second mortgagee, both being "debtors" within the
meaning of the section, and, of course, not pledgees. However, even if Section 74
12. See PA. STAT. ArN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 21, § 651; RUP, supra note 5, at 8-13 20-
21; Note (1933) 81 U. oF PA. L. Rrv. 348.
13. See Section 74(a): "The term debt for the purposes of an extension shall include
all claims of whatever character against the debtor or his property, wihet er or not u:
cla ms would otherwise constitute Provable claims under this tfie." See also Comment
(1933) 18 ST. Louis L. REv. 324, 325.
14. See Weikel v. Davis, 109 Wash. 97, 101, 186 Pac. 323, 324 (1919). See aho ,*ca:o.
(1922) 17 A. L. R. 714.
15. Even the instant court recognizes the only material question to be whether or not
the first mortgagees have claims upon the property of the second mortgagees. Brunn v.
Wichser 75 F. (2d) 25 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1934) at 27.
16. In re Doelger, 6 F. Supp. 776 (S. D. N. Y. 1933); see 76 CoNG. Rxc. 4S77, 4S78,
4S79 (1933) ; Garrison, supra note 1, at 297. It is indicative of this legislative intent that,
after it had been held that, where the mortgaged real estate is in the possssion of a
receiver in foreclosure proceedings, the security was not in the "constructive po-emon"
of the debtor so as to permit an extension of the mortgage claim under Section 74, the
Act was amended expressly to overcome the effect of that holding. In re Parmenter, 70
F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934); In re Billmert, 71 F. (2d) 411 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934).
But see 48 STAT. 922, 11 U. S. C. A. § 202m (1934) [Now part (in) of Section 74].
17. As originally proposed, the Act did not contain this requirement. But it was feared
that if pledgees were deprived of the power of sale, they might be induced to demand
more collateral, which would result in a restricting of the flow of credit. See Senate
judiciary Committee Report of Feb. 10, 1933, Stow. Doc. 1215, 72nd Co!;G. 2nd Sens. p. 5;
76 COING. R.c. 4878 (1933); see also N. Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1933.
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should be interpreted to require that the second mortgagee show constructive pos-
session of the mortgaged premises in order to secure relief, it may be asserted that
since he has the right to possession,' 8 he is in "constructive possession" of the prem-
ises within the meaning of Section 74.19
It thus appears that in basing its denial of relief to the second mortgagee on the
ground that the latter did not hold legal title to the premises upon which the first mort-
gagee claimed, the court in the principal decision failed to satisfactorily answer the
contention of the second mortgagee. For, since Section 74 does not require the
"debtor" to have legal title to the mortgaged premises in order to secure relief, but
merely requires that he possess "property" in it, the concept of property being satisfied
by less than legal title to real estate, the question as to whether or not the second
mortgagee held legal title was immaterial.
Furthermore, in holding that the mortgage lien of the second mortgagee is not a
sufficient property interest to satisfy the requirements of Section 74, but that title
alone will suffice, the court rests its decision on a distinction without a substantial
difference. For it is generally recognized that the mortgagee has the same property
interest in the land whether he is in a title theory or in a lien theory state.20
Moreover, in its preoccupation with the determination of whether the second mort-
gagee held title, the court seems to have overlooked the fact that the express purpose
of Section 74, to avoid so far as possible further destructive liquidation by forced sale
in the already depressed market, would favor such a construction of the broad pro-
visions of the Section as would save the property interest of the second mortgagee.21
RIGHT TO RECOVER FOR PRENATAL INJURIES
IN A recent Texas case,' a woman eight months pregnant was injured in an auto-
mobile accident caused by the negligence of the defendant's servant and shortly
thereafter she gave premature birth to twin babies, one of whom was so badly
bruised that he died after living nineteen days. The parents brought action against
the defendant for the death of the child under the state's wrongful death statute
which allows recovery for wrongful death only where the deceased could have
recovered had he lived.2 The court, reversing a judgment for the plaintiffs,8 held
that the parents had no right of action under the statute since the child could
not have recovered for prenatal injuries if he had lived, not being in esse at the
time of the accident and therefore incapable of being owed a duty of care by the
defendant, and furthermore, since, even though proximate causation was admittedly
shown in the principal case, the administrative difficulties of proving proximate
causation in the majority of such cases outweighed any possible considerations favor-
ing the creation of such a new cause of action where one had not previously existed.
18. Randall v. Jersey Mortgage Co., 306 Pa. 1, 158 At. 865 (1932); Bulger v. Wilder-
man and Pleet, 101 Pa. Super. 168 (1931).
19. See Wilson v. Chappell, 244 Ky. 521, 524, 51 S. W. (2d) 669, 670 (1932); Lofatad v.
Murasky, 152 Cal. 64, 68, 91 Pac. 1008, 1010 (1907); Weinstein, supa note 1, at 174.
20. Sturges and Clark, Legal Theory and Property Mortgages (1928) 37 YAL.E L. 3.
691, 709.
21. See 76 CoNG. RE . 4877, 5014; Garrison, supra note 1, at 291; KIINANE, supra note
1, at 291-297; Legis (1933) 33 CoL. L. REv. 704-705.
1. Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 78 S. W. (2d) 944 (Tex. 1935).
2. Tax. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1925) art. 4672.
3. The Court of Civil Appeals had allowed recovery. Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling
Co. v. Jordan, 47 S. W. (2d) 901 (Tex. 1932).
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Every appellate court of final jurisdiction in the United States which has passed
upon the question presented by the instant case has denied recovery either for
wrongful death,4 or for physical disability5 caused by prenatal injuries.0 Although
courts frequently will admit that the child's injury was caused by the defendant's
negligence, they will give as their reason for denying recovery that the child, while
en ventre sa mere has no independent existence, being really a part of its mother
and not a person in esse at the time of the accident, to whom the defendant could
owe a duty. It is not true, however, that for all purposes a child en ventre sa mere
is non-existent, either physically or legally.7  Thus in the law of property he is
in esse for all purposes which are to his benefit.8 He may take by descent? or under
a will'0  or marriage settlement," have a guardian appointed,1 - be made an
executor,1 3 and, through his guardian, may secure an injunction to stay waste.14
The criminal law also regards him as a separate entity.15 Thus it has been held
that when a child born alive dies as a result of prenatal injuries inflicted by an
unlawful beating of the mother, the wrongdoer is guilty of murder.16  And even
under the statute involved in the principal case, a six months posthumous child vas
allowed to recover for the wrongful death of his father and was said to have been
in being at the time of the injury to his father.
17
4. Dietrich v. Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. St. Rep. 242 (1834); Gorman v.
Budlong, 23 R. I. 169, 49 Atl. 704 (1901); Buel v. United Rys., 243 Mo. 126, 154 S. W.
71 (1913); Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 214 Ala. 611, 103 So. S66 (1926).
5. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 IIl. 359, 56 N. E. 638 (190D); Nugent v. Brook-
lyn Heights R. Co., 209 N. Y. 515, 102 N. E. 1107 (1913); Lipps v. M ihvaukee Electric
R. & L. Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N. W. 916 (1916); Drobner v. Peters, 232 N. Y. 220, 133
N. E. 567 (1921).
6. England does not allow recovery. Walker v. Great Northern Ry. of Ireland, L. R_
28 Ir. 69 (1891). Contra: JAPA'EsE CIvIL CODE (Sebald, 1934) art. 721 ("for purposa.
of the right to demand damages a child in the womb is deemed to have been born").
See generally Frey, Injuries to Enfants En Ventre Sa Mere (1927) 12 ST. Lours L. Rvv.
85; Kerr, Action By Unborn Infant (1905) 61 Cr-Nr. L. J. 364; Morris, Injuries to En-
fants En Ventre Sa Mere (1904) 58 Ca.'r. L. J. 143; Straub, Right of Action for Pre-
natal Injuries (1930) 33 LAW Norm 205.
7. HEizoG, MmicA. JURISPRUDEN=c (1931) §§ 860-975; ,AoY, Lmr.L A=aTom.y &ND
SURGERY (1930) 669-687.
8. Hall v. Hancock, 15 Pick. 255 (Mass. 1834); Campbell v. Everhart, 139 N. C. 503,
52 S. E. 201 (1905); d. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Robertson, 82 Tex. 657, 17 S. W. 1041
(1891).
9. Deal v. Sexton, 144 N. C. 157, 56 S. E. 691 (1907).
10. Biggs v. McCarty, 86 Ind. 352 (1882).
11. Millar v. Turner, Ves. Sen. Supp. 63 (Ch. 1748).
12. See Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Ves. Jr. 227, 321 (Ch. 1799).
13. Ibid.
14. Musgrave v. Parry, 2 Vern. 710 (Ch. 1715); see Wallis v. Hodson, 2 Atk. 114, 117
(Ch. 1740).
15. See State v. Walters, 199 Wis. 68, 70; 225 N. W. 167, 168 (1929); Hnzax, Mamnc.
JuRisPRUDExcE (1931) §§ 914-916.
16. Clark v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 23 So. 671 (1898). Cf. Morgan v. State, 148 Tenn. 417,
256 S. W. 433 (1923).
17. Nelson v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry., 78 Tex. 621, 14 S. W. 1021 (1S90); Cf. St.
Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Pearson, 170 Ark. 842, 281 S. W. 910 (1926) (FaEnAr.
Ear pr.oaLO ' Lmn=a'II Acr); The George and Richard, 3 Adm. & Eccl. 466 (1871) (L:.mn
CA1nWBEr's Acr).
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While the courts' decisions denying a right of action for prenatal injuries re-
peatedly refer, in justification of the result, to the theory that the defendant can
owe no duty to an object without independent existence, nevertheless, the con-
siderations primarily impelling the courts seem to be largely practical. For, in
personal injury cases, the fact that a child was en ventre sa mere adds greatly to
the difficulty of proving causation,' 8 an immaterial consideration in the determination
of an unborn child's property rights. Furthermore, courts express an apprehension
that, if such an action were allowed, recovery would in many instances depend upon
mere speculation as to causation and the door would be open to fictitious claims.10
In addition to these considerations motivating the courts, there are the considera-
tions that prenatal injury litigation is very rare20, that it forms no pressing social
problem,21 and that the imposition of liability would have no effect in reducing the
number of injuries.22 When, however, as a result of medical rather than legal ad-
vances, prenatal injuries can be traced with a reasonable degree of certainty, the
strongest of the reasons for denying a right of action to the child will have dis-
appeared. Several courts, 23 including the Supreme Court of Canada,24 have decided
that medical science has already reached this stage and have allowed recovery.
Nor, when once this medical advance has been achieved, will courts find much
difficulty in finding a legal justification for the result. Thus, the courts may, as was
suggested in a strong dissent,25 in meeting the argument that a right cannot accrue
to a child not in existence, recognize the cause of action only if the child en ventro
sa mere has reached such a stage of development at the time of the injury that
he could live if separated from his mother, and may thus be said to have been
in esse at the time. This limited form of recovery would also tend to answer the
objection to recognizing the cause of action based on the difficulty of proving
proximate causation. For, in cases where the injury took place at a time when
the child was already capable of leading a separate existence, the fact that the child
at birth was found incapable of doing so could be more easily traced to the injury
than where the child was in a more immature stage of development at the time of
injury and might therefore have become physically impaired as a result of many
causes other than physical injury to his mother. However, a second possible line
of argument would sustain a cause of action even where the child at the time of
injury was not yet capable of separate existence, the grounds being that there is
ample legal authority for the fact that a child is in esse from the time of con-
ception. 26 Furthermore the fact that a child cannot bring action immediately
18. Lipps v. Milwaukee Electric R. & L. Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N. W. 916 (1916)
(allegation that plaintiff suffers from epileptic fits as a result of injuries received when a
foetus of five months).
19. See GR=, JUDGE AND JURY (1930) 77-96 (the administrative factor).
20. As more becomes known about the effects upon the child of the prenatal environ-
ment, this type of litigation will undoubtedly increase. Cf. Goodrich, Emotional Disturb-
ance as Legal Damage (1922) 20 MIcH. L. R-v. 497.
21. See Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk (1929) 38 YALE L. 5.
584, 720; Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision of Certain Types of
Tort Cases (1930) 78 U. oF PA. L. REv. 805, (1931) 79 U. or PA. L. REv. 742.
22. See GRaxm, JUDGE AND JUR (1930) 77, 97, 98 (the preventive factor).
23. Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227 (1924).
24. Montreal Tramways v. Leveille (1933) S. C. R. 456 (1933), 4 D. L. R. 337 (a child
was allowed to recover for prenatal injuries which resulted in its being born with club'feet).
25. Boggs, J., in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Il1. 359, 374, 56 N. E. 638, 642
(1900).
26. Supra, notes 8-17.
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after the injury will raise no procedural obstacles to recognition of his cause of
action. The law recognizes that there may be a claim or right to damages even
though the right to bring action does not accrue until a later date.2 Upon this
reasoning, the courts which have allowed recovery have held that a child's right
to sue for prenatal injuries accrues at birth.28  When an action vas brought before
the birth of the child, by his next friend, the complaint was simply dismied
without prejudice.29
Instead of granting a separate right of action to the child, however, a simpler
solution might be to allow the mother to recover in her own right for the injuries
to the child. This would eliminate the controversy as to whether a child en vetre
sa mere is in esse and can be owed a duty and have a right of action. Assuming,
as the courts do, that the child is only a part of his mother, there is still a duty
not to negligently injure the mother, and one of the accepted rules of tort law is that
liability will be imposed regardless of the fact that the peculiar physical condition
of the plaintiff contributed to the extent of the injury.' This rule has frequently
been applied in cases where the injuries to the plaintiff were greatly increased
because she was pregnant.3 ' Following this line of argument, several courts, while
denying to the child a right of action, have stated that the mother may recover for
damages to the child which are not too remote,32 and the Supreme Court of
Alabama, although reversing a judgment for the plaintiff because of insufficient
evidence, recently held that the mother could recover in one action for all her
injuries including the death of the child.33 If this view is generally adopted, the
door will no longer be closed ta just claims for prenatal injuries.?
DEBTOR'S POWER UNDER SECTION 77B TO Rmov REORGANizATioN PRocuEDINGS
To CouRT oF ITS OWN CHoIcE
A cREnroRs' petition for reorganization under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy
Act' was filed by a debenture bondholders' committee and two other creditors of
a corporation in a Federal District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia.
The next day, in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York,
the corporation itself filed a debtor's petition for reorganization under 77B. This
petition was approved a day later. Then the corporation appeared in the West
Virginia court and moved that the creditors' petition be dismissed on the ground that
27. May v. State, 133 Ind. 567, 33 N. E. 352 (1893).
28. Kine v. Zuckerman, supra note 23; Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, supra note 24.
29. Smith v. Fox, 53 0. L. R. 54 (Can. 1922).
30. Watson v. Rinderknecht, 82 Minn. 235, 84 N. W. 798 (1901); Lous-ville & Nash-
ville lr. Co. v. Wright, 183 Ky. 634, 210 S. W. 184 (1919); HAmnm, Low or To=as (1933)
§ 129.
31. Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 48 Blinn. 134, 50 N. W. 1034 (1892); Alabama
Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916).
32. See Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17, 52 Am. St. Rep. 242, 245 (1834);
Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 214 Ala. 611, 612, 103 So. 566, 566 (1926).
33. Snow v. Allen, 227 Ala. 615, 151 So. 468 (1933).
34. If the child were granted a separate right of action, however, the contributory
negligence of the mother would probably not bar recovery. Gulues.rian v. Madiz-on Rail-
ways Co, 172 Wis. 400, 179 N. W. 573 (1920) (negligence of the mother not imputed to the
child).
1. 48 STAT. 912, 11 U. S. C. A. § 207 (1934), hereinafter called § 77B.
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the New York court had already acquired exclusive jurisdiction of the case.2 The
West Virginia court denied the corporation's motion to dismiss and approved the
creditors' petition, holding that it had already acquired exclusive jurisdiction because
the first petition had been filed therein. On appeal this ruling was reversed by the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on the ground that jurisdiction
over a reorganization under 77B is acquired by the court first approving a petition,
not by the court in which the first petition is filed.3
This decision allows the debtor corporation to choose the court in which the
reorganization proceedings will begin, since immediate approval may be obtained,
without a hearing, for a debtor's petition, 4 while no action may be had upon a
creditors' petition until the debtor has been allowed ten days in which to appear
and contest it.5 Thus, by filing a petition in another court and getting it approved
before answering a previous creditors' petition, the debtor can prevent approval of
the creditors' petition by the court in which it was filed, and in effect remove the
entire proceeding to a court of its own choosing. The court so chosen by the debtor
will not necessarily be the one in which the reorganization will eventually be
carried out, since the Act provides for transfer of the proceedings to the "jurisdiction
where the interests of all the parties will be best subserved," 0 a requirement which
the courts have interpreted broadly.7  Nevertheless, the power of the debtor
ordinarily to choose the court in which the reorganization will begin is of consider-
able tactical advantage to the debtor in the early stages of the reorganization. For
it gives the debtor not only the bargaining weapon inherent in its power to delay
the proceedings, but also, where its petition is approved, the advantage of being
able to choose a court in which its officers and counsel may be personally known,
and the opportunity, as the party initiating the proceedings, to create the im-
pression that all creditors objecting to its proposals are merely attempting to delay
approval of a plan of reorganization. Thus, the power given to the debtor in the
principal case aids the debtor in becoming a valuable ally, or a dangerous adversary,
to the various groups of creditors.
In the exercise of this power, the debtor may be expediting the presentation of
a suitable plan of reorganization, or it may be delaying the presentation of such
a plan. This depends upon the nature of the creditors' petition which is eliminated
by the debtor's petition, or which is not filed because of the probability that it will
2. Section 77B, subs. (a) provides that "the court in which such order approving the
petition ... is entered shall, . . have exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property
wherever located for the purposes of this section."
3. Hamilton Gas Co. v. Watters, 75 F. (2d) 176 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935). The case was
remanded to the District Court for determination of a contested issue of fact, namely,
the location of the principal place of business of the corporation. Since the determination
that the principal place of business was in New York was the ground for jurisdiction of the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York, that question of fact might
well have been considered res judicata. The Federal District Court for West Virginia would
in effect be reviewing a finding of fact by the New York Court. The ruling as to jurisdic-
tion was followed in In re Kelly Springfield Tire Co., N. Y. L. J. April 12, 1935, at 1871,
col. 4 (S. D. N. Y.)
4. 77B(a). 5. 77B(a). 6. 77B(a).
7. In re Consolidated Gas Utilities Co., 8 F. Supp. 385 (D. Del. 1934) ; In re Sierra
Salt Corp., 8 F. Supp. 922 (D. Nev. 1934); In re Syndicate Oil Corp., 9 F. Supp. 127 (D.
Del. 1934). Transfer has been allowed, however, only to courts in which an original
petition might have been filed. In re Midland United Co., 8 F. Supp. 92 (D. Del. 1934);
In re Syndicate Oil Corp., 8 F. Supp. 213 (D. Del. 1934); (1935) 44 YATr L. J. 885.
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be so eliminated 8 The creditors filing the first petition may be a minority group
which is incapable of enlisting the support of a large enough percentage of the
other creditors to satisfy the requirements for approval of a plan. Such a group is
likely to have been organized by lawyers who are interested in the reorganization
merely for the fees which may be obtained in the process of obstructing iL Insofar
as the ruling of the principal case has the effect of permitting the debtor, in
cooperation with a more powerful group of creditors, to file a petition which will
override the "strike" petition of such a minority group, it will do much to eliminate
delay.10  In most reorganizations it will have such an effect, because the debtor
is likely to act in cooperation with a powerful group of creditors, composed of a
majority of the bondholders, who have been organized by a protective committee
or by the investment banking house which was trustee for the bond issue.
The power afforded to the debtor by the rule of the principal case may also,
however, be used in an attempt to force creditors to give unfair advantages to
the officers and stockholders of the debtor corporation. In this case, the ability
to override a prior petition of creditors in another court, so beneficial in the case
of a "strike" suit by minority creditors, becomes an instrument of delay which
the debtor may use merely to postpone an inevitable and necessry reorganization.
This, apparently, was the situation in the principal case, where the delay had
already lasted seven months.'"
A possible check upon the power of delay thus given to a debtor not cooperating
with the majority creditor group is suggested by the procedure followed by the
Federal District Court for Maryland in the Kelly-Springfield case.12  There a
hearing was held in order to give creditors an opportunity to attack the good faith
of a debtor's petition brought after a creditors' petition had already been filed in
another court. But even if such a procedure should be followed, it is not often likely
to be successful because of the difficulty of proving bad faith.13 Since ordinarily,
however, the debtor is likely to act in cooperation with the majority bondholder
group, the delay in the occasional case where it does not cooperate would seem
to be but the price which must be paid for a procedure which in most cases provides
a means of avoiding obstruction by minority groups.
8. It is probable that one effect of the decision in the principal case will be to put an end
to the filing of creditors' petitions, except in cases where the reorganization can be started
in no other way, because of the ease with which the debtor can override them. The effect
of the power given to the debtor is the same, however, whether actually exercised upon a
creditors' petition already filed or merely usd as a threat to prevent creditors from filin
a petition.
9. For discussion of these "knights errant of the bar" see Foster, Conflicting Ideals for
Reorganization (1935) 44 YrAi L. J. 923.
10. The imperative need for some procedure which will accomplish this is pointed out
in Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Deelopments of the Last Decade
(1927) 27 COL. L. R.v. 901, at 921, and in Swaine, Corporate Reorganication under
the Federal Bankruptcy Power (1933) 19 VA. L. REv. 317.
11. This prolonged delay was caused in part by the fact that the decision of the
District Court approving the creditors' petition necessitated an appeal to the Circuit Court
of Appeals. Similar opportunities for delay might be created, however, by appeal by the
debtor from orders of the court in which the debtor's petition had been approved.
12. In re Kelly Springfield Tire Co., N. Y. L. J., April 12, 1935, at 1871, cols. 4-7 (two
cases: S. D. N. Y. and D. Md. 1395).
13. This problem is fully discussed in a Comment (1934) 48 hLv. L. Rm. 283. See
also In re South Coast Co., 8 F. Supp. 43 (D. Del. 1934); In re Electric Public Service Co,
9 F. Supp. 128 (D. Del. 1934).
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POWER OF AN ExECUTOR TO WAIVE THE DEFENSE OF STATUTE OF FRAUDS
DECEDENT orally promised a bank, of which he was the chairman of the board
of directors, that he would not permit it to suffer any losses from loans which it
might make to two corporations in which the decedent's sons held substantial interests.
Relying upon the promise, the bank did make loans to the two corporations and
suffered considerable losses when both corporations subsequently became insolvent.
The decedent, however, died before fulfilling his promise and the bank, which was
also an executor of the estate, presented to the probate court a claim for its losses
on the loans, which was allowed as a just debt of the estate. The federal tax
commissioner, however, refused to permit the bank's claim to be deducted as a debt
in arriving at the decedent's net taxable estate, for the reason that the promise of
the decedent was within the Statute of Frauds, being a promise to pay the debt
of another, and the executors could not avoid the federal estate tax by waiving
the obligor's defense and treating the claim as a just debt of the estate.1 In a suit
to recover the taxes collected by the commissioner on the amount of the bank's
claim against the estate, the District Court held for the plaintiff on the ground that,
although the decedent's promise was within the Statute of Frauds, it was not void
but merely voidable and the executors had a right to waive the defense of the
Statute of Frauds and pay the claim as a debt of the estate.2 The Circuit Court
of Appeals, while denying the power of the executor to waive the obligor's defense,
nevertheless affirmed the judgment of the lower court on the ground that the promise
of the decedent was not within the Statute of Frauds since it imposed a direct
primary obligation upon the promisor and therefore constituted a just debt of the
estate.3
Although the cases applying the section of the statute involved in the principal
case are in hopeless conflict, 4 there is little doubt that the decedent's promise would
ordinarily be held to be a promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage
of another,5 and not an independent promise. It is apparent that the debt to the
bank was primarily owed by the corporafions of the decedent's sons. It is only
reasonable to suppose, moreover, that the bank's original intention was to look first
to the recipients of the loans for its reimbursement and that the decedent intended
such to be the procedure; so that the decedent's promise was not independent, but
a promise to answer for the debt of another and thus within the statute. The court
apparently rested its decision, however, upon two facts; namely, that the promise
of the decedent related not to an existing, but to a future indebtedness,
0 and that
1. A further contention of the government was that the claim of the bank was not
based on "adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth" within the meaning
of the statute. 44 STAT. 835 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. § 1095 (1928). This contention was
overruled by both courts, however.
2. Mitchell v. United States, 5 F. Supp. 301 (N. D. Ill. 1933).
3. United States v. Mitchell, 74 F. (2d) 571 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934).
4. See Comment (1934) 44 YA=E L. J. 1053.
5. Bennighoff v. Robbins, 54 Mont. 66, 166 Pac. 687 (1917); ILI. ANN. STAT. (Smith-
Hurd 1933) c. 59, § 1- 29 CAR. II, c. 3 (1677); Corbin, Contracts of Indemnity and Statute
of Frauds (1928) 41 HARv. L. Ray. 689, 694 ("Thus if S says to C: 'Lend money to P and
I will indemnify you against loss,' the promise of S is a promise to answer for P's debt to
C and is within the statute.").
6. This factor has sometimes led courts to hold a promise without the statute, Lusk
v. Throop, 189 Ill. 127, 59 N. E. 529 (1901); see also Note (1930) 4 U. or CIN. L. REV.
392. But it is generally held that the principal debt need not exist at the time of the
promise in order to bring the promise within the statute of frauds. BRAmar, SumYarvsunw
AN GuArmnzY (3d ed. 1905) § 86; Corbin, op. cit. supra note S.
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the bank obviously would not have made the loans if the decedent had not promised
to repay the losses, if any. While both of these facts are evidentiary of a definite
reliance by the bank upon the decedent's promise in advancing the loans, this is
not to say that credit was extended primarily to the decedent rather than to the
corporations. It seems doubtful that such facts should have persuaded the Circuit
Court to treat the decedent as a primary debtor, particularly when such a finding
was adverse to that of the trial court.
It was apparently the theory of the Circuit Court of Appeals that the government
had the right to question the enforceability of the promise as within the Statute
of Frauds. Yet it is well settled that the issue of the Statute of Frauds is alto-
gether personal to the contracting parties and that a stranger to the contract can
neither raise the question nor require a contracting party to do so.y Considerations
of equity and morality have given rise to the holding that a contract within the
statute is as good as any contract until challenged by a person entitled to raise the
defense,8 since the defense is always waivable.9 Thus, it would seem that the ques-
tion of the Statute of Frauds might have been held to be of no legal concern to
the government in the principal litigation, unless it be considered to be in a more
favored position than an ordinary stranger; and it does not appear why this should
be the case. Furthermore, the Circuit Court of Appeals was not bound by pre-
cedent to reverse the District Court on the law, for the very few cases that have
passed on the issue as to whether an executor has the power to waive the defense
of the Statute, have gone both ways.10 And to sustain the conclusion of law reached
by the District Court, the Circuit Court of Appeals could have cited the analogous
situation where executors have been allowed to waive the defense of the Statute of
Limitations in respect to claims against the estate.11 It is not apparent why the
7. Kemp v. National Bank, 109 Fed. 48 (C. C. A. 4th, 1901); Edwards Mfg. Co. v.
Bradford Co., 294 F. 176 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923); Vaught v. Pettyjohn and Co., 104 Kans.
174, 178 Pac. 623 (1919) ; Elliott v. Scoville's Assignee, 144 Ky. 584, 139 S. W. 805 (1911) ;
Givens v. Mason, 205 Ky. 432, 266 S. W. 7 (1924) ; Parish & Co. v. Yazoo & Mi. V. R. Co.,
103 Miss. 288, 60 So. 322 (1913); Tanner v. McCreary, 88 W. Va. 658, 107 S. E. 405
(1921); 1 WnrL1usOs, CONTRACTS (1920), § 530.
8. Humphrey v. Johnson, 73 Ind. App. 551, 127 N. E. 819 (1920); Vaught v. Pettyjohn
and Co., 104 Kans. 174, 178 Pac. 623 (1919); Givens v. Mason, 20S Ky. 432, 265 S. W.
7 (1924); Hoffman v. Charlestown Five Cents Say. Bank, 231 Mass. 324, 121 N. E. 15
(1918); Creswell v. McCaig, 11 Neb. 222, 9 N. W. 52 (1881).
9. Kemp. v. National Bank, 109 Fed. 48 (C. C. A. 4th, 1901); Hooper v. Reed, 211
Ala. 451, 100 So. 875 (1924); El Dorado v. Kinard, 96 Ark. 184, 131 S. W. 460 (1910);
Walker v. Walker's Assignee 41 S. W. 315 (Ky. 1891); Clarke v. PhUomath College, 99
Ore. 366, 195 Pac. 822 (1921); De Proy v. Progakis, 259 S. W. 620 (Tex. CL Civ. App.
1924).
10. That the executor lacks power to waive the defense of the statute: In re Rownson,
29 Chanc. Div. 358 (1833); Haskill v. Manson, 200 Mass. 599, 602, 86 N. E. 937, 938
(1909) (mere dictum); 3 SCHOtULm, EXMc-TOIS AND ADurns=MATOns (6th ed. 1923) §
2509 (Does not say that executor has not the power to waive the defense but asserts that
one who does so is chargeable with devastavit). Contra: Arkansas Valley Trust Co. v.
Young, 128 Ark. 42, 195 S. W. 36 (1917). "When death only prevents one from plrform-
ing a contract, his personal representative is not compelled to set up the Statute of Frauds
to defeat the performance of such contract. To so hold would be to convert a statute
which was intended to shield from fraud into an instrument by which fraud could be Ir-r
petrated."
11. Conway's Ex'r v. Reyburns Ex'rs, 22 Ark. 290 (1860); Rhodes v. Driver, 103 Al.
g0, 157 S. W. 147 (1913); 1askell v. Manson, 200 Mass. 599, 86 N. E. 937 (1909); Hodg-
don v. White, 11 N. H. 208 (1840). 3 WnImsmoN, op. cit. supra note 7, § 2002. An
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defense of the Statute of Frauds should not also be readily waivable, particularly
in the absence of a protest from the legatees.
Thus, it would seem that there was little necessity for a reversal of the District
Court on the law. The promise of the decedent was within the Statute and a
holding to that effect would not have compelled a judgment for the government, a
result which neither court desired. Although the promise of the decedent was within
the Statute, the evidence of the decedent's promise and of his intention to fulfill it
is so clear and overwhelming that the Circuit Court of Appeals need have had little
compunction in allowing the executor to treat the claim as a just debt. The Statute
of Frauds is not designed to effectuate, but to prevent wrong.12 It was the avowed,
fear of the Circuit Court of Appeals that if it should lay down a rule permitting
the deduction from the gross estate of voidable claims predicated only on moral
obligations of the decedent, the temptation to pay debts which might otherwise be
later pressed against individual legatees, without, however, their securing the benefit
from being allowed to deduct the claim for estate tax purposes, would be irresistible,
thus curtailing the estate tax revenue of the government. It seems difficult, however,
to sustain the judicial encouragement of the repudiation of moral and equitable
obligations on the ground that the government coffers might thus be more amply
replenished.
executor may not, however, waive the non-claim statute designed to effectuate the speedy
settlement of estates. Hodgdon v. White, 11 N. H. 208 (1840); 3 SCIOULER, op. cit. supra
note 10, § 2511.
12. Davis v. Patrick, 141 U. S. 479 (1891); 1 WnmsToi op. cit. supra note 7, § 452.
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